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ABSTRACT  
Where water resources are scarce and water quality is diminishing, market–based 
instruments have better potential than government regulation alone to increase the efficiency of 
resource use, to reallocate water to other uses and to improve water quality in an efficient and 
equitable manner.  
The SSRB is a region in Southern Alberta known for water scarcity, growing competition 
for water and, an increasing threat of pollution by point and non-point sources. This research has 
addressed the perceptions of stakeholders about proposed system of water quality trading to 
supplement the existing system of government regulation and water trading. A survey was 
structured to examine stakeholders’ perceptions about (1) resource status; (2) their rights and 
responsibilities under current system of administration, and (3) their rights and responsibilities 
under the proposed system.  
Survey results revealed stakeholders concerns about the ability of both existing and 
proposed systems to secure their access to water if annual water supply continues to decrease. 
Despite concerns about increasing scarcity respondents did not perceive transferability of water 
licences as important due to lack of trading experience and existence of regulatory barriers that 
impede markets and discourage participation. Reluctance to explore markets could have been as 
well related to the high risk of losing the unused water.  
Under the proposed system stakeholders’ perceptions of their abilities to secure rights 
pertaining to water quality improved. However, obtained data were insufficient to judge with 
certainty the applicability of the proposed system in the region. Results were inconclusive to 
determine the extent and origin of non-point source pollution by agriculture. Also, research is 
needed to determine how elimination of potential institutional barriers, i.e. a risk to lose water 
and inability to maintain private licences to instream flow, would influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions about their rights and responsibilities under proposed system.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem statement 
Water is the basis of human well being. Many places in the world are now approaching 
the point of “peak water” or, in other words, they are experiencing severe shortages of the 
supply of clean water (Palaniappan and Gleick 2009). It is predicted that the needs of developed 
countries for water will increase by 18% by 2025 (UNEP, 2007); an increased demand that 
comes at a time when the global supply of freshwater is steadily decreasing and today’s supply 
in some places is as low as half of the 1980’s supply. A water crisis becomes inevitable where 
rising rates of consumption coincide with steadily declining supply (Anderson and Snyder 
1997).  
At the same time, pollution of surface waters has been increasing as a result of urban 
growth, unregulated non-point source runoff, and decreased assimilative capacity of water from 
diminishing natural water flows (Gillian and Brown 1997, Nicol and Klein 2006, Maas and 
Tefter 2008). Every year more than 500 million tons of pollutants are dumped into water bodies 
globally, of which 70% are untreated (World Bank 2007, UNEP 2010). 
Although many factors influence water quantity and quality, two main conditions play a 
significant role in explaining the interdependent nature of these two dimensions. Provision of 
water quality is an important ecological service, which depends on the amount of flow available 
for assimilation and filtration of pollutants (Andersen and Snyder 1997, Vander Ploeg 2010, 
Palaniappan and Gleick 2009). Second, the amount of pollution dispersed into a water body is 
often proportional to the quantities of water withdrawn by various users and returned to the 
stream (Weinberg et al. 1993, Andersen and Snyder 1997, Eheart and Ng 2004). As a result, 
diminishing freshwater resources and increasing pollution have been related to the wasteful use 
of water, which arises with the lack of appropriate water quantity and quality management 
mechanisms (Anderson and Snyder 1997, Porto and Lobato 2004). Addressing the issue of water 
resources management is important to satisfy growing demand for clean water from competing 
uses, including environmental and ecological uses. Recognizing the benefits of conjunctive water 
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quantity and quality management (i.e. management of the interdependence of water quantity and 
quality), regulators can allocate rights to use water and pollute thus accounting for both water use 
trends in the watershed and the ability of a stream to assimilate wastes resulting from such uses 
(Porto and Lobato 2004, Andersen and Snyder 1997, Woodward and Keiser 2002, Howe et al. 
1986).  
Extensive research has been done to examine the effect that water resource management 
such as administrative/command and control
1
 or incentive-based approaches might have on 
achieving desirable economic, social and environmental outcomes. The literature has 
documented that incentive-based instruments drive water users’ behaviours and can lead to more 
efficient allocation of scarce water resources than can traditional administrative systems (Stroup 
and Baden 1979, Howe et al. 1986, Brubaker 1995, Thobani 1997, Easter et al. 1999, Rosegrant 
and Gazmuri, 2001, Horbulyk 2007). Similarly, where environmental water quality is a concern, 
markets for water quality achieved remarkable results in meeting desired environmental 
objectives at a lower cost (Tietenberg 1990, Kraemer et al. 2004). Although other incentives 
based instruments, e.g. taxes or charges, are sometimes used to induce pollution reduction efforts 
by polluters, they were found inefficient in mitigating the cumulative effects where reduction is 
required from multiple sources with significant difference in control costs (Howe 1994). The 
advantages of market-based approaches include the flexibility in adapting to rapidly changing 
conditions as decisions are driven by price signals (Stroup and Baden 1979) that reflect water 
availability (Horbulyk 2007) and/or quality (Tietenberg 1990). 
Typically, governments manage natural resources that are regarded as public property, 
and government oversight dominates over the decisions of individual users. Although it is 
generally believed that markets are mechanisms that function properly only if property rights are 
privately held, studies show that water markets can be implemented under different property 
                                                             
1 Allocation of water resources by government regulation is an administrative approach; water 
pollution and quality control by government regulation is considered a command-and-control approach 
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rights regimes (McCay 1996). It is argued that users benefit from a resource commensurate with 
the degree to which decision-making powers are shifted to the users of the resource (Brubaker 
1995). Although water is often a public-type good managed by government agencies, water 
transfers are, therefore, subject to approval by a government agency.  Rights ultimately allow 
users to transfer water creating private incentives to use water efficiently, to sell saved water, or 
to avoid costs of purchasing additional water. This allocation method is distinct from traditional 
government regulation because part of the decision-making power has shifted away from 
government administrators to water users and users are capable of making decisions on water use 
based on its value in alternative uses.  
Another market mechanism to manage water resources, known as water quality trading, 
has been used in some areas in the United States where deteriorating water quality had 
necessitated actions aimed at efficient pollution reduction from multiple sources, including non-
point pollution sources, with different control costs (Woodward and Keiser 2002, Porto and 
Lobato 2004). Increased pressure on environmental water quality has led to tightening 
wastewater regulations and establishment of pollution caps (Fassbender 1994). The introduction 
of water quality markets, wherein lower-cost pollution credits could be obtained from reductions 
by non-point sources, has reduced the costs of achieving desirable environmental water quality 
(Tietenberg 1990, Porto and Lobato 2004, Selman et al. 2009). At the same time quality trading 
provided polluters with a flexible tool to meet pollution reduction requirements, thus shifting part 
of the decision making away from government to users.  
In Canada, the ownership of water is vested with the Crown, which is also responsible for 
managing public water resources on behalf of citizens (Hurlbert 2007, Horbulyk 2007). Although 
water governance systems vary by province, in the West most authority to manage water 
resources was delegated from the federal government to the provinces (British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba) by the 1930 Natural Resource Transfer Agreement (Percy 
1977). Therefore, in Alberta the government has been responsible for issuing and revising water 
licenses since 1930. Licences have been issued and maintained in accordance with the system of 
prior allocation and other applicable laws (Hurlbert 2007, Percy 1977). Licences can be issued to 
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individuals or groups, allowing them to manage water either individually or collectively. These 
licences do not create private property rights in water but rather a private right to use a property 
owned by the Crown. The extent to which this private interest is protected is subject to the 
conditions of the licence and applicable legislation (Hurlbert 2007, Saxer 2010).  
In the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB), Southern Alberta, the historical system 
of prior allocation
2
 benefited some consumptive licence holders, e.g. agricultural, with quantities 
of water that were allocated based on the priorities of use and water availability at the time of 
allocation. By the time development extended beyond irrigation, the watershed became fully 
allocated and, therefore, unavailable for allocation for emerging uses, including environmental 
(Percy and Weber 2010).  In the late 1990s, the Alberta government initiated allocation by 
market regulation by revising the Alberta Water Act (Cantin et al. 2005, Nicol and Klein 2006).  
Among the primary reasons for administering the market system was to reallocate water from 
existing uses (such as agriculture) into emerging uses (such as municipal and environmental) 
without increasing supply (Vander Ploeg 2010, Owens 2012).  
Water quantity trading has been implemented in southern Alberta to also improve the 
efficiency of allocating water between competing uses. However, an increase in water 
productivity from decreased water consumption by some users does not necessarily lead to the 
                                                             
2  In the Western U.S. and Canada historical water rights doctrines that constitute the legal basis for 
water governance are riparian and prior appropriation/prior allocation (Vander Ploeg 2010). Under the 
riparian doctrine, landowners whose property adjoins a flowing water body have rights to make reasonable 
use of the water, i.e. use water for domestic or production purpose as long as this use does not substantially 
diminish or otherwise significantly impair the rights of other users (Andersen and Snyder 1997). Expansion 
of human settlements beyond land adjoining to water bodies called for a more novel method for water 
allocation. The prior appropriation doctrine, commonly known as First-in-Time-First-in-Right (FITFIR), 
facilitated this expansion and economic growth by granting water rights to those who first claimed the 
beneficial use of the water. Property rights of those who claimed the beneficial use are protected by the 
appropriative doctrine in time of shortage on a FITFIR i.e. senior rights holders have priority over junior 
rights holders in satisfying their entire appropriated volume of water (Andersen and Snyder 1997).  
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achievement of social and environmental objectives (Cantin et al. 2005, Berkes 1996). For 
example, this might include protecting other users from damage or leaving more water instream 
to improve services maintained by instream flow. In fact, activating previously unused licences 
in Southern Alberta might lead to higher rates of consumptive use, increased drainage of 
pollutants and compromised ability of the stream to dilute pollution (Bjornlund 2010, Berkes 
1996).  
Water quality in Alberta has been traditionally regulated using the command-and-control 
approach, whereby point-source polluters have been strictly regulated and over time required to 
undertake significant improvements to treatment technologies, thus reducing pollution (Matisz et 
al. 2010). However, the effect from this reduction has been compromised due to urban growth 
and intensive agricultural development (Matisz et al. 2010). Agricultural activities constitute the 
greatest increase in water use in Southern Alberta (Vander Ploeg 2010, Percy and Weber 2010, 
Bjornlund et al. 2007). Pollution from nonpoint sources, agricultural in particular, is mostly 
unregulated, and therefore, the contribution to surface water pollution from these sources can be 
significant (Matisz et al. 2010). These factors coupled with increased consumptive demand 
negatively influence river flows and water quality.   
Growing concerns about diminishing water quality, urban growth and intensive 
agricultural development in the SSRB make this region a potential area that could benefit from 
implementing water quality markets to complement water quantity markets. Where water 
resources are scarce and environmental water quality diminishes, and impact from agricultural 
water use on other users is evident, establishment of a pollution cap might constitute a limit to 
pollution and might set additional limits to consumption. A pollution cap specifies the maximum 
allowable loading of identified prevailing non-point source pollutants and will be derived based 
on the assimilating capacity of the stream, i.e. the amount of water necessary to maintain 
required surface water quality standards. Surface water quality standards determine the resulting 
pollution cap, which is reflective of the demand for water quality in the area.  Establishment of 
quality trading might also help to equalize pollution abatement costs among users with different 
costs, i.e. cost-efficiency conditions (Tietenberg 1990). The equity condition is satisfied to the 
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degree to which prices for water licences and discharge permits capture the value of water 
scarcity and quality (Weber 2001). Considering the interdependences between water quantity and 
quality, the pollution cap might motivate water users to leave more water instream to improve 
assimilative capacity of the stream, thus facilitating maximizing net social benefits from water 
use. Improvement of instream flow by private water users is, however, subject to favorable 
institutional conditions, i.e. secure entitlements to instream flow are legitimized and privately 
held (Andersen and Snyder 1997). Other instream flow users such as fishers and recreation users 
for example, might benefit from steady maintenance of sufficient streamflows, including reduced 
effects from eutrophication and improved aesthetics.  
The overall potential benefits from implementing parallel quantity and quality markets 
can include:  
- Reallocation for compensation 
- Improved water quality 
- Increased supply of instream flow 
- Pollution reduction from nonpoint sources  
It is argued that individuals act in their own interest as they perceive and “they do so 
within the prevailing institutional arrangement” (Stroup and Baden 1979). It is also believed that 
an effective institution will be one that is efficient, perceived by users as equitable and creates 
the incentives to conserve (Howe et al. 1986).  Although studies prove that neither public 
administration nor market-based instruments can succeed absolutely in providing such a system 
of resource allocation, combining two types of markets might enhance benefits and relieve the 
societal burden of dealing with water scarcity and quality.  
1.2 Research purpose and objectives 
Benefits arising from the introduction of water quality markets might be significant and 
equitable to the interests of individuals and society at large. However, shifting to a new 
allocation process might increase uncertainty about the outcome unless strong drivers exist to 
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trigger an institutional change (Howe et al. 1986). Users might accept the proposed system of 
parallel quantity and quality trading only if the proposed system has the potential to deliver 
important services that are undersupplied under the current allocation system. In general, the 
factors that might trigger such a change would be the acknowledgement by users that the 
following conditions exist: 
- Water scarcity is perceived to be sufficient to initiate institutional change 
- Water quality conditions are perceived to be sufficiently low to initiate institutional 
change 
- The current water administration system does not address water quantity and quality in 
an efficient and equitable way  
The goal of the proposed study was to examine the conditions that would lead to the 
introduction of market-based instruments as a means to allocate water quantity and quality. It is 
important to identify and understand conditions and possible barriers that might factor into the 
willingness or reluctance by stakeholders to accept these instruments. The purpose of the present 
work is to determine the acceptability of the dual market scheme (quality and quantity trading) 
based on stakeholders’ perceptions of resource status and attainability of resource users’ rights 
and responsibilities under existing and proposed systems of water administration. To test 
stakeholders’ willingness to adopt a dual water-market scheme I will use a case study approach 
focused on southern Alberta.  My research objectives are to:   
- identify stakeholders’ perceptions of the current resource status (scarcity/quality)  
- evaluate stakeholders’ perceptions of the current water administration including their 
experience with water markets  
- evaluate the willingness to adopt a proposed water quality market mechanism  
Using a case study approach, I will be able to assess perceptions regarding environmental 
and administrative conditions and the willingness of stakeholders to adopt market-based 
approaches to water management.  Such information is important because understanding and 
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including stakeholders’ values can determine the viability of a proposed policy and will facilitate 
its implementation and buy-in by the community of water users. 
1.3 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis begins with a review of primary and secondary literature, respective 
legislation, peer-reviewed articles, and guidelines and reports regarding water allocation and 
administration, quality control and trading.  The examples of water allocation and water 
pollution markets within the global context have been examined in order to define the conceptual 
framework for the proposed research. The study includes a review of documented advantages 
and disadvantages peculiar to administrative and market-based resource allocation approaches, 
and summarizes the conditions in which running both types of markets in parallel might result in 
optimal resource allocation. 
The next section presents the survey methodology used to assess stakeholders’ 
perceptions. I developed an online survey to examine the perceptions about existing and 
proposed water allocation and quality control systems. The surveyed population was divided into 
three categories: agricultural, municipal, and others – provincial regulatory, NGOs, and legal 
academic. The study area is the SSRB in Alberta, the second largest watershed in southern 
Alberta that consists of four sub-basins – the South Saskatchewan, Oldman, Bow and Red Deer 
Rivers.  
The results of the survey are discussed in the following section and evaluated in the 
context of literature review findings. Finally, I conclude with findings and recommendations that 
reveal the potential to implement a system of parallel water quantity and quality markets in 
Southern Alberta.  
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2 WATER ALLOCATION MARKETS AND POLLUTION MARKETS  
About one third of the world’s population lives in regions with high to moderate water 
stress (World Resource Institute 1998). In the last 40 years the global population has grown 
rapidly and has passed the seven billion mark; water demand has doubled and water withdrawn 
annually exceeds the water replenishment rate (Deloitte 2012). According to UNEP (2007) by 
2025 more than 1.8 billion people, almost two thirds of the world’s population will live in 
locations with profound water scarcity.  
At the same time, pollution of surface waters has been increasing as a result of urban 
growth, unregulated non-point source runoff and depleting streamflows. Where waste was once 
effectively diluted due to sufficient natural flow, the growing population and diminishing 
supply of natural flow have resulted in an impaired ability of watercourses for self-cleansing 
(Hanna et al. 1996). A 2006 assessment of water bodies in the United States found 48% of 
rivers and streams, 60% of lakes, reservoirs and ponds, and 61% of estuaries unsuitable for their 
designated use (Selman et al. 2009).  
Pollution originates from two sources: point (identifiable) and nonpoint (unidentifiable) 
(Maas and Telfer 2008). Point sources can be regulated and include sewage plants and 
industrial facilities that discharge effluents directly to the receiving watercourse (ibid.). 
Nonpoint sources, originating from agricultural and urban runoff are characterized by the 
diffuse character of the pollution and in some cases account for the larger share of overall 
pollution loads. Typically, such sources are difficult or impossible to regulate because their 
sources cannot be identified (Selman et al. 2009). The agricultural sector, for example, accounts 
for 70% use of globally available potable water (1% of the total amount of water on Earth) and 
is the main nonpoint source of water pollution (UNEP, 2010). The agricultural sector is the 
main source of pesticides and nitrates in drinking water (i.e. water that is withdrawn for 
drinking purpose either directly from well or by water utility), and one of the major sources of 
excess nutrients, (e.g. phosphorus and nitrogen), in watercourses (Ongley 1996). Excessive 
amounts of nutrients cause eutrophication such as severe algae blooms, which then decompose 
resulting in oxygen-depleted water often referred to as dead zones. Globally, at least 405 areas 
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including coastal waters where nutrients are discharged either directly or transported by rivers, 
experience severe oxygen depletion (Selman et al. 2009). Where a watercourse is affected by 
eutrophication, its ability to provide suitable drinking water is also affected and water treatment 
costs are significantly increased (ibid.).  
It is argued that the lack of freshwater access and pollution are related to a lack of 
appropriate water resource management approaches (Anderson and Snyder 1997). Lacking the 
incentives to conserve water, users engage in wasteful use (Anderson and Snyder 1997, Cantin 
et al. 2005). Nonpoint pollution sources remain largely unregulated and, therefore, do not face 
the liability for their share of surface water pollution. Considering the need to satisfy growing 
demand for clean water and the growing recognition of the inherent value of ecosystems, 
implementing adequate water resource management mechanisms is crucial to economic growth, 
social wellbeing and preservation of environmental integrity. 
The next section focuses on the types of water management institutions and instruments 
and their effectiveness in achieving socially optimal outcomes. The effectiveness of different 
water policy regimes and instruments are explored in the context of improving water quality and 
mitigating water scarcity and their ability to address the issues of quantity and quality 
conjunctively.  
2.1 Property rights and institutional structure 
Institutional structure has an important influence on individual behavior but dealing with 
a complex reality makes it difficult to identify structures that induce socially optimal behaviours, 
i.e. motivate individuals to make private decisions compatible with social objectives (Furubotn 
and Richter 2005, Howe et al. 1986). Different economic theories suggest different methods of 
governance. A legal system of governance, wherein rules are made and enforced exclusively by 
government authorities, is central to neoclassical economics, whereas new institutional 
economics relies more on informal contract enforcement, wherein decisions are made by 
individuals in a decentralized manner, or a combination of both (Easter et al. 1999). According 
to Furubotn and Richter (2005) neoclassical theory heavily relies on the legal system based on 
11 
 
the assumption that the enforcing agency possesses full and complete information and is able to 
predict and prevent possible negative outcomes. This approach, however, disregards challenges 
of centralized monitoring and enforcement, and the importance of understanding the multiple 
agents’ expectations and behaviours in a given context.  
The theory of general equilibrium assumes that governments are impartial and that 
actions of the government are guided by the “principle of inviolability of property rights” 
(Furubotn and Richter 2005). However, in real life laws often accommodate large business 
enterprise and disregard or underestimate the interests of other users (Brubaker 1995). 
Furthermore, the complex or fluid nature of some resources makes it difficult to define rights 
clearly and, therefore, interests often intersect (McCay 1996, Brewer et al. 2006). Even if laws 
aim at promoting equity, in the absence of complete information about intersecting interests of 
the individuals, law enforcement might inadvertently protect property rights of some individuals 
while confiscating the rights of the others (Furubotn and Richter 2005, Baden and Stroup 1978). 
Furubotn and Richter (2005), and Brubaker (1995) argue that the fate of a natural 
resource can be foreseen based on the state of ownership, i.e. public or private. Brubaker (1995) 
and Andersen and Snyder (1997) have highlighted the role of private property rights inherent to 
common law doctrine in protecting resources from degradation. The authors pointed out that 
where strong property rights to use a resource are held privately, users have strong incentives to 
protect the resource from overexploitation and other users from damage, as they are held 
responsible for that damage. On the other hand, McCay (1996) argues that unattenuated private 
property rights are no guarantee that their owner will conserve a resource, and that wise 
intervention by government is required to uphold all private property claims and to prevent 
externalities
3
 and indirect ecological effects. Howe et al. (1986) highlighted the importance of 
                                                             
3 An externality exists when some outcomes (positive or negative) of a decision were not accounted 
for in the process of the decision making (Stroup and Baden 1979). In case of decisions related to water use, 
such externalities can include changes in water quantity and quality downstream as a result of changes in 
water allocation and pollution upstream (Andersen and Snyder 1997)  
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institutions that are capable of providing sufficient coordination to make decentralized decision-
making consistent. 
Clear specifications of property rights regimes and definition of rights are critical to 
efficient resource management (Stroup and Baden 1979). Coase (1960) set forth the conditions 
that require property rights that are (a) exclusive – all benefits and costs associated with the 
resource are captured by the owner of a resource; (b) enforceable – the owner can prevent others 
from using or otherwise altering the resource, and (c) transferable – the owner of the resource 
can sell it in return for fair compensation.  
However, several factors contribute to the complexity of defining rights to water clearly, 
selecting the right property rights regime and appropriate definitions. First of all, freshwater 
resources are regarded as common pool resources, which are characterized by low excludability 
and high rivalry (Berkes 1996, McCay 1996). In addition, water is regarded as a valuable public 
resource in most jurisdictions and, is therefore considered public property (Saxer 2010, 
Horbulyk 2007). As a result, governments manage water resources on behalf of the public, and 
the decisions of individual users are subject to scrutinized government oversight. Private rights 
to use rather than own water resources emerge from recognition that private interests in water 
exist (Saxer 2010). Market-based approaches are sometimes used to create private incentives to 
complement government regulation. Bundles of rights, or the extent to which rights are 
recognized and protected as private interests, vary across jurisdictions. The extent of such 
protection by government intervention, and resulting market effectiveness and efficiency, is 
subject to the conditions of the underlying legal system and other relevant regulations.  
Recognizing that a rule made and enforced exclusively by government authority, is 
inevitably incomplete and, therefore, inefficient, Furubotn and Richter (2005), and Ostrom 
(1992), suggest decentralizing decision making by empowering individuals’ abilities to respond 
to various incentives that would drive socially optimal behaviour among private agents. With 
regard to natural resource use, those incentives could be produced either by the resource itself, 
i.e. resource status, or be provided by markets, with additional limits set by wise government 
regulation (McCay 1996).  
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2.2 Water allocation 
There are many ways to allocate water, with myriad outcomes in terms of equity and 
efficiency. Systems range in their ability to set limits on individual behaviours while allowing 
individuals to exercise rights to make decisions about water use, conservation and sharing while 
staying within those limits. Faced by increasing scarcity and diminishing water quality, it will be 
important to determine a desirable form of water resource allocation that maximizes social 
objectives, including water conservation.  
According to Howe et al. (1986) socially optimal systems of water resource allocation 
should be flexible, efficient, must be perceived by the public as equitable, and create incentives 
for conservation. In other words, water should move to its highest value use, users should 
account for the value of water, including its quality in alternative uses, and users must be held 
responsible for altering the resource condition and resulting damage to other users. It should also 
reflect public values that would not be otherwise accounted for by individual decision-makers, 
i.e. the values of instream flow and environmental water quality (ibid.).  
Institutions that allocate resources evolve in response to the resource status (McCay 
1996), which in case of a water resource is the supply of the resource to satisfy the demand in 
water quantity and quality. Where the resource is abundant, in the absence of competition, water 
is allocated to emerging uses as needed and with fewer restrictions. As water resources become 
scarce, there is a need for the institutions that would allocate the resource in a manner that 
would balance the competing interests (Andersen and Snyder 1997). Therefore, resource 
condition is an important factor in accessing the appropriateness of selected institutions. Also, 
behaviour of private agents and resulting decisions to a greater extent depend on the way their 
rights and responsibilities to use the resource are defined and enforced under different systems 
of governance (Rosegrant and Gazmuri 2001).  
Instruments to manage water quantity and quality range from administrative or 
command-and-control to incentive-based. Administrative or command-and-control instruments 
are composed of regulations and standards established and enforced by government authorities 
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to execute water resource allocation and quality control. In contrast, market-based approaches 
are incentive-based instruments where individuals make decisions about using the resource in 
response to price signals established by markets.  
2.2.1 Water allocation through public administration 
Under an administrative allocation system, a public authority is solely responsible for the 
assessment of current water demands and uses its coercive power to initially allocate, physically 
distribute, and if necessary, reallocate water to alternative uses (Rosengrant and Bingswanger 
1994). Instream uses, such as fisheries, wildlife, recreation and navigation, are secured through 
reservation of minimal streamflow and restrictions imposed on other water users through 
diversion caps (Jillilan and Brown 1997, Dinar et al. 1997, Kwasniak 2006).  
Several disadvantages have been associated with the public administration of water 
rights allocation, especially where watercourses have reached their allocation limits. Those 
disadvantages stem from government’s discrete authority with respect to reallocating water 
when demand for a resource increases and new users claim water, and insufficient security of 
private water rights, which diminishes private incentives (Andersen and Snyder 1997).   
Sectors with historical senior water rights, like the agricultural sector, that have a higher 
investment in water, resist giving up their water and are likely to protest compulsory 
reallocation. Even in the face of changing demands for water, any reallocation by a government 
authority would undergo a lengthy process of negotiating compensation with the losers 
(Thobani, 1997, Rosengrant and Bingswanger 1994). This happens because government 
authority has limited knowledge about the value of the damage or loss to individual users, and in 
making the decision to compensate might either overestimate or underestimate the value of the 
damage, thus leaving an individual or society worse off (Brubaker 1995). A farmer might value 
his foregone property higher than the compensation offered and society might end up bearing 
higher costs of compensation, as government authority has no incentive to make economically 
viable decisions other than those concerned with long-term political accountability (Stroup and 
Baden 1979). If reallocation instream is not voluntary, then governments can secure only 
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minimal flow reservation, often insufficient to maintain essential ecosystem services (Andersen 
and Snyder 1997) 
Facing a threat of losing unused water and lacking the incentives to save it, private rights 
holders engage in its wasteful use and are discouraged from investing in water-efficient 
technologies (Andersen and Snyder 1997). Facing pressure from new users and resistance from 
existing users to relinquish water, governments are forced into satisfying demand by increasing 
supply, i.e. construction of massive waterworks that come at even greater costs to the 
environment and society (Andersen and Snyder 1997).  
2.2.2 Water allocation by means of markets 
As the issue of water scarcity grows in tandem with economic growth and urbanization, 
and watercourse allocations reach their limits, policy-makers have expanded their attention to 
explore incentive-based approaches – markets in particular – as a means of complementing 
government regulation. Unlike administrative systems of allocation, a market approach 
constitutes a voluntary mechanism to reallocate water through price signals that inform the 
decisions of buyers and sellers and channel water to its highest-value uses (Stroup and Baden 
1979, Howe et al. 1986, Owens 2012, Horbulyk 2007).  
The ability to sell water induces investments in water-saving technologies, thus 
encouraging technological innovation (Thobani 1997, Horbulyk 2007). Allowing the price of 
water to fluctuate according to supply and demand, water markets induce users to consider the 
full opportunity cost of water, including the cost in alternative uses (Howe et al. 1986, Rosegrant 
and Binswanger 1994). As a result, the user will have little incentive to engage in wasteful use as 
long as he has the opportunity to sell the saved water in return for fair compensation as 
determined by the market. Facing the necessity to pay for any additional water, users responsible 
for distribution of water would be motivated to maintain leak-proof distribution infrastructure 
and other measures that would encourage water-saving behaviour.  
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It is generally recognized that allocation of scarce water resources by market regulation is 
more efficient than by government administration alone because individual behaviours are driven 
by stronger incentives to conserve water – incentives resulting from adding a transferability 
element to the definition of property rights (Bjornlund 2006, Easter et al. 1999, Rosegrant and 
Gazmuri, 2001). Although users’ decisions about water use are voluntary, water markets help to 
induce socially optimal behaviour, i.e. increased water use efficiency and voluntary reallocation 
of existing supply to other uses. 
2.2.3 Government regulation of water markets  
Despite the recognition that markets can help to reallocate water and facilitate efficient 
water use, there are a number of challenges associated with this allocation approach. According 
to (Brennan & Scoccimarro 1999, Howe 1998, Easter et al. 1999, Weinberg et al. 1993, Cantin 
et al. 2005, Brewer et al. 2006, Owens 2012) third-party effects and damage to the environment, 
including changes in water quality are externalities that might be induced by water transfers.  
With regard to third-party effects, the argument is that other legitimate users are damaged 
as a result of water transfers (Howe et al. 1986). For instance, in irrigation only some water is 
actually consumed during the irrigation process –the unconsumed part, i.e. return flow, usually 
returns to the hydrological system and becomes available to other users downstream of the 
irrigated property. However, occasionally, there will be a decrease in drainage flow when users 
upstream sell saved water away from the original diversion point. This activity can inadvertently 
damage rights holders immediately downstream if they rely on this return flow for their water 
supply or dilution of wastes (Andersen and Snyder 1997). A possibility to transfer the saved 
water and so-called “sleeper rights” – volume of water that was envisaged by allocation but was 
not actually used – almost inevitably leads to increased consumptive use by the transferee 
(Bankes 2006) unless saved or previously unused water is reallocated instream. As a result less 
water is left for the aquatic ecosystems and wastewater dilution. Intensification of consumptive 
use might in some cases lead to increased pollution and as a result, a detrimental impact on water 
quality (Weinberg et al. 1993, Andersen and Snyder 1997).  
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Andersen and Snyder (1997), Saxer (2010), Bauer (2004), Howe (1998), McCay (1996), 
Bjornlund (2006) acknowledge that government intervention is necessary to prevent public and 
private users from potential damage resulting from externalities. However, Andersen and Snyder 
(1997), Easter et al (1999), Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994), Rosegrant and Gazmuri (2001), 
Thobani (1997), Bjornlund (2010) argue that excessive government intervention impedes 
allocation by markets. All of the above conditions and contradictory outcomes of unregulated 
and over-regulated water markets can be exemplified by two comparatively distinct systems of 
implementation: water markets in California, one of 12 arid western U.S. states where markets 
are strictly regulated and Chile, which implemented a free market in water rights.  
In California, title to water belongs to the state and private rights to use water are 
established within the system of prior appropriation (Saxer 2010). State water authorities are 
responsible for determining and enforcing the rules for using water and protecting instream flow 
interests on behalf of the public. Markets are authorized under California Water Code, section 
475 (1990), “in a manner that protects the interests of other entities who have rights to, or rely 
on, the water covered by a proposed transfer”. The “no injury rule” addresses the issue of return 
flow and other third-party effects, the protection of which is exercised through restrictions on 
transferability of private rights (Mentor 2001, Rosegrant and Gazmuri 2001, Thobani 1997, 
Dunning 2003).  Although no specific stream flows have been mandated, the state has the 
authority to acquire and hold water rights for enhancing flow whenever necessary. The State has 
the right to exercise any restrictions of existing water uses in order to secure instream flow 
interests. However, laws specifically mandate that no restriction shall cause ‘substantial harm’ to 
any lawful user of the water in question (Dunning 2003). As a result each proposed transfer must 
undergo the prolonged approval process and the water authority has the discretionary power to 
weigh the effects on other users and the environment against the benefits of the transfer. Facing 
the legislative dilemma wherein public and private interests are recognized as legitimate, and 
pressure from consumptive users, the state water authority has been often unable to provide 
sufficient protection of public instream interests (Dunning 2003). 
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Furthermore, limited transferability of private rights to use water resulted in diminishing 
market efficiency. Therefore, despite profound water scarcity, users in California continue to 
grow low-valued crops and are often engaged in wasteful use (Thobani 1997).  
According to Andersen and Syder (1997), Kwasniak (2006) and Harris Consulting (2003) 
the possibility to lose unused water is another important factor potentially impeding market 
efficiency, diminishing the security of tenure and narrowing water management options by users, 
conservation in particular. Under prior appropriation doctrine water rights in California can be 
reduced or cancelled if water is not used as licenced. 
In contrast to California, markets in Chile are characterized by strong property rights, 
broad private economic freedoms, and limited government intervention (Bauer 2004). The 1981 
Water Code applies to the administration of water use in streams and the distribution of water to 
secondary channels and individual users. The Code handles private rights holders that form three 
levels of water users’ associations (WUAs) (Donoso 2006). There are no restrictions as to 
purpose or manner of water use and users have complete freedom in the use of water, subject to 
their respective water use rights (Hearne and Donoso, 2005, Donoso 2006). Return flows can be 
used by recipients without the need to establish a right of use and are subject to flow availability 
and usage rates by the rights holders. Rights cannot be lost if water is not used, which coupled 
with transferring the ownership of infrastructure to WUAs, had strengthened the security of 
tenure and created private incentives for conservation (Donoso 2006, Hearne and Easter 1995).   
Although formal markets have been active only in parts of Chile where water was a 
scarce resource, significant efficiency improvements of 20-26% were achieved in agricultural 
water use: 70% reduction in water use in wood pulp production and increased urban and rural 
water supply and sanitation coverage (Hearne and Easter 1997, Bauer 2004, de la Luz Domper 
2009). One of the key components of the reform was delegating most of the decision-making 
power to water users, which relied upon the establishment of strong and freely transferable 
property rights (de la Luz Domper 2009). Despite widely recognized positive implications of free 
markets established under the 1981 Water Code, Hearne and Easter (1995), Rosegrant and 
Gazmuri (1995), Bauer (2004) and Donoso (2006) pointed out several disadvantages. They 
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argued that the system in Chile was lacking environmental protection incentives and mechanisms 
enabling government to set the limits to water use in case of drought or any threats of severe 
environmental damage (Bauer 2004, Mentor 2001, Kraemer et al. 2004). 
As demonstrated above, despite considerable difference in the extent of decision-making 
freedom by private users in California and Chile, both jurisdictions fell short of the mechanisms 
to reconcile public and private interests (Mentor 2001). The primary purpose of implementing 
water quantity markets in California and Chile was to reallocate scarce water resources between 
competing ends in a decentralized manner. In other words, all users that were allowed to 
purchase and hold private rights were capable of competing in the market. As illustrated by the 
California and Chile cases, markets resulted in better performance where stronger private 
property rights in water existed. Since in both cases the private sector was not allowed or 
otherwise motivated to hold private rights to instream flow, environmental interests were secured 
by government reservation and, therefore, not supplied by markets. Whereas technical efficiency 
has increased due to increased productivity of water and reallocation to higher valued uses, 
improving to some extent social benefits from water resource use, the overall benefits were not 
maximized as important public instream interests were largely undersupplied by markets. 
Markets provide flexibility in allocation, and market-clearing prices force users to 
consider the opportunity cost of water resources; therefore, fairness between buyer and seller is 
implied as one would otherwise avoid the trading (Howe et al. 1986). It follows that stronger 
transferable rights to water are a prerequisite to improving water use efficiency and to secure 
water to other users by means of markets.  
Property rights have long been governed by the principle “use your own property so as 
not to harm another” (Brubaker 1995). However, in a complex reality where uncertainties and a 
presence of multiple agents make it difficult to foresee damage, individual users would rarely 
account for such damage unless their responsibilities are as clearly defined as their rights. 
Therefore, establishing private responsibilities for public interests is crucial to securing the 
supply of those interests (Andersen and Snyder 1997, Rosegrant and Gazmuri 1995, Cantin et al. 
2005).  
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In watersheds with multiple users and different types of polluters, water quality is an 
important public interest whereby the provision of clean water is a direct consequence of water 
allocation and water use (Andersen and Snyder 1997, Howe et al. 1986). Although other factors 
such as climate and precipitation influence the quality of water, water quality is directly related 
to water quantity for two main reasons. First, the ability of a water body to assimilate waste 
depends on the quantity of water available to dilute waste (Woodward and Keiser 2002, 
Andersen and Snyder 1997). Second, the quality of the water of a water body depends on the 
magnitude of the pollution resulting from water consumption (Andersen and Snyder 1997, 
Weinberg et al. 1993). In other words quantity and quality issues are interrelated to the extent to 
which quality is affected by the amount of water available instream and quantity and quality of 
the return flow. In this respect, establishing responsibilities for the impact on water quality 
resulting from exercising private consumption rights would be critical for an effective water 
allocation system. Considering the costs of water and wastewater treatment born by private users 
as a result of diminishing surface water quality, water quality is an important private interest 
compatible with public interests. Therefore, in order to yield maximal net social benefits an 
optimal water allocation system would integrate quantity and quality considerations (Andersen 
and Snyder 1997, Howe et al. 1986, Porto and Lobato 2004).  
The next section examines the allocation of responsibilities for water quality among 
water users, incentives provided by various quality control systems to reduce pollution in 
response to changing water quality, quality requirements and willingness of users to pay for and 
maintain desirable water quality. 
2.3 Institutions to regulate water quality 
Approaches to regulate water quality include command-and-control and incentive-based 
instruments, similar to water allocation approaches, vary to the extent of decision-making power 
exercised by water users and regulating authority. The command-and-control approach is a 
typical example of a regulatory instrument that is decided and enforced by public powers. There 
are two types of instruments that represent the command-and-control approach in water 
pollution control systems - technology-based standards and performance-based standards.   
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Technology-based standards are uniform effluent “end-of-pipe” standards that are 
achievable using the best available pollution abatement technologies (Porto and Lobato 2004). 
Under this approach identified polluters are required to install specific abatement technologies 
that would yield the maximum pollution reduction achievable by these technologies. The 
performance-based standards specify environmental water quality objectives and require all 
identified and regulated sources in the watershed to attain this objective by establishing the total 
maximum amount of pollutants that can be discharged to the watercourse. Both technology-
based and performance-based standards have proved effective in achieving substantial point 
source pollution reductions (Kraemer et al. 2004). However, the literature highlighted several 
disadvantages limiting the effectiveness of command-and-control measures, especially when 
point sources reach the limit of efficiency in maintaining compliance to specified standards 
(ibid, Tietenberg 1990, Woodward and Keiser 2002). 
First, prescription of standard abatement technologies discourages investments in 
technological innovation because sources are not required to improve their performance beyond 
the capacity of the prescribed technology. Also, regulations disregard the difference in control 
costs across pollution sources and, as a result, responsibilities to reduce pollution loads might 
be distributed so that some sources face higher costs of reduction (Fassbender 1994). At the 
same time nonpoint sources that are largely unregulated and whose pollution reduction costs are 
lower, have no incentives to reduce pollution loads. As additional control requirements are 
imposed on point sources, reaching the limits of control efficiency, become prohibitively costly, 
and environmental water quality will decline if contribution from nonpoint pollution sources is 
significant (Woodward and Keiser 2002). This effect might be particularly significant in areas 
with large agricultural developments (Selman et al. 2009). 
In contrast, incentive–based instruments use an array of financial incentives, such as 
taxes/charges, subsidies or markets to motivate a desirable behaviour and reduce pollution.  
Pollution or input taxes are widely used by the European Community countries, whereas the 
U.S. has increasingly made use of tradable discharge permits (TDPs), i.e. quality trading, to 
help achieve environmental quality goals (Howe 1994). Although widely used in the EU 
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countries, consideration of political feasibility often results in taxes that are too low to have 
noticeable incentives (Howe 1994). Therefore, if, for example, input substitutes require larger 
investment than costs incurred by taxation, polluters would pay a tax and continue to pollute. 
Imposition of a pollution tax can be highly effective in preventing pollution from heavy 
individual polluters, but less effective where there is a need to reduce the pollution loads from a 
growing number of pollution sources as it does not set a limit to cumulative pollution (Howe 
1994). At the same time pollution taxes do not constitute the least cost option and might 
discourage innovation. Also, lower cost effectiveness is argued to be another disadvantage of 
taxes and charges as compared to another incentive-based approach – markets for water quality 
(Howe 1994). 
Water quality trading is a mechanism to increase water quality in a cost-effective 
manner through defining and assigning responsibilities to use water. According to Tietenberg 
(1990) a “well-defined pollution trading system can cost-effectively allocate the control 
responsibility for meeting a predefined pollution target among the various pollution sources 
despite incomplete information on the control possibilities by the regulatory authorities”. 
Indeed, markets are triggered by the establishment of pollution reduction targets: e.g. water 
quality standards that require all sources collectively to achieve them in a given watershed 
(Selman et al. 2009). Regulators impose a pollution cap on the watershed where environmental 
water quality objectives are not met, i.e. the total amount of pollutants allowed in the watershed 
over time (ibid., Eheart and Ng 2004). A pollution cap is set to reflect a set of conditions, such 
as water quantity and temperature, which determine the assimilating capacity of the water body 
(Howe 1994). Upon imposition of a cap, all point sources are allocated with their respective 
share of pollutants in the form of an effluent permit. A “good” thus defined by the effluent 
permit represents “concentrations of a pollutant based on the location and magnitude of the 
pollution” (Tietenberg 1990). Under this system, point sources depending on their costs of 
control, have several options ranging from improving their own facilities to purchasing 
additional permits from other facilities, or to invest directly in reduction equivalent from non 
point sources (Lal 2010, Eheart and Ng 2004).  
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To date quality trading has been implemented in watersheds where, despite high public 
and private costs, environmental water quality diminished, thus compromising the ability of 
users and the environment to satisfy quality needs (Woodward and Keiser 2002). The primary 
purpose of establishing a pollution cap has been to limit the flux of pollutants, mainly nutrients, 
to a watershed and reduce the impact on users with high quality requirements (Selman et al. 
2009). Allowing trading in these cases served as a means to relieve a control burden by point 
sources, and in particular, sources with high control costs (Lal 2010, Fassbender 1994, 
Tietenberg 1990, Eheart and Ng 2004).  
According to Tietenberg (1990), the magnitude of potential cost savings is very high if 
trading takes place between point and nonpoint sources due to significant difference in marginal 
control costs, an efficiency condition for pollution reduction. This happens because nonpoint 
sources have large potentials to reduce pollution and their reduction costs prove to be much 
lower than those of point sources. Therefore, where the impact from agricultural non-point 
sources was significant, municipal and agricultural users established point to non-point source 
trading programs, wherein municipal users invested in reduction from agricultural users 
(O’Grady et al. 2008, Lal 2010). Credits generated through reduction by non-point sources were 
used to offset pollution by point sources. Program designers established trading ratios that 
allowed the elimination of any distortions resulting from uncertainties in reduction by non-point 
sources. Trading ratios varied depending on the complexity of the reduction program, 
geographical conditions and resulting uncertainty. Ratios could range from 2:1 (two units of 
reduction from non-point source to offset one unit of pollution from a point source) to 4:1 (four 
units of reduction from non-point source to offset one unit of pollution from point source). In 
addition to considerably reducing control costs by municipal point sources, trading helped to 
reduce the overall stream of pollutants from otherwise unregulated or under-regulated 
agricultural non-point sources by creating monetary incentives to reduce pollution, thus 
improving environmental water quality (Selman et el. 2009) – the best outcome that coincides 
with the social objectives (Tietenberg 1990).  
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2.4 Combined water quality and quantity markets  
The literature addresses the performance of various water allocation systems based on a 
variety and range of users’ rights and responsibilities secured by each system.  Literature reveals 
the difficulties inherent with each system of governance as a result of the fluid nature of water 
coupled with intersecting public and private interests. Intensive government oversight has been 
criticized for impeding water quantity markets’ efficiency but has been so far justified due to the 
lack of legal instruments to safeguard other users and the environment from damages. However, 
negative effects can occur under any type of water governance regime (Andersen and Snyder 
1997). Indeed, reduction in return flow can happen under any type of allocation system if more 
water-efficient technologies are adopted (Brennan and Scoccimarto 1999, Donoso 2006). 
Similarly, instream flow needs can be undersupplied under any type of governance regime, 
especially if water was historically allocated under a system of prior appropriation (Andersen 
and Snyder 1997, Johnson 1988, Kwasniak 2006). Instream flow needs are either not recognized 
as legitimate or secured through junior rights, whose supply is reducible to the needs of the 
senior consumptive rights. Where provision of instream flow is secured by a diversion cap 
imposed by government, this reservation if established after the basin became overallocated, is 
often minimal and therefore insufficient to satisfy instream needs (Kwasniak 2006, Wenig et al. 
2006, Jillilan and Brown 1997, Andersen and Snyder 1997). Damage to third parties, e.g. 
diminishing water quality, can be equally a result of water transfers, increased consumption by 
existing users or unregulated pollution by non-point sources.  
Considering that neither government regulation nor markets can alone safeguard all users 
from damages, the desirability of each approach under certain conditions can be assessed against 
its ability to achieve the highest aggregate benefits (Howe et al. 1986). Although literature has 
not documented empirical observations, few theoretical studies have mentioned benefits of 
conjunctive water quality and quantity management, coupling water quantity and quality markets 
in particular. 
Brubaker (1995) argued that where property rights to the resource are clearly defined, 
then whoever values the resource more will end up with the resource. It was posited that the 
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definition of users’ rights and responsibilities would ideally reflect users’ expectations about the 
state of the resource and perceptions of potential damage (Howe et al. 1986, Brubaker 1995). 
Brewer et al. (2007), and Weber (2001) have emphasized the willingness of users to pay for 
better water quality, and that location-specific difference in water quality might influence water 
pricing in the market. Howe et al. (1986) suggested including within water licences the 
description of the water quality of which users are entitled. The quality could be enforced 
through the establishment of maximum attainable environmental water standards, which could be 
achieved only if enforced of all water users in the watershed. Howe et al. (1986) and Andersen 
and Snyder (1997) articulated that where rights to clean water cannot be otherwise defined, the 
pollution cap and a system of tradable pollution rights have the potential to facilitate the 
achievement of an established water quality standard.  
Furthermore, a body of literature emphasized the effect of diminishing return flow on 
water availability to some users, but very few mentioned its potential impact on source water 
quality. Indeed, where return flow originates from irrigation, whose polluting effect is widely 
recognized, its impact on receiving water quality and associated damages to other users might be 
significant if this water is allocated for stock-watering or drinking water for human consumption 
(Weinberg et al. 1993, Johnson 1989). The severity of the effect depends on the amount of water 
originally diverted and consequently returned to the stream (Woodward and Keiser 2002). 
Considering that agricultural sources are nonpoint sources and therefore unregulated, additional 
costs borne by municipal users include meeting strict regulations to reduce pollution from 
municipal wastewater and to improve surface water quality.  
Weber (2001) argued that the optimal outcome from resource allocation could be 
achieved by coupling a market for water quantity and quality in the watershed where both 
dimensions of the resource are scarce. According to the model developed by Weber (2001) a 
market for water quantity coupled with a quality market internalized impacts on water quality. 
The level of water quality depends on both surface flows and discharge magnitude and the effect 
of return flow increases downstream as a result of the consumption and decreased streamflow 
upstream. The changing value of the water as its quality changes is reflected by its market price. 
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At the same time users are held responsible for changes in water quality by maintaining the 
assigned location-specific discharge loads, with control costs reflecting water quality at a spot 
resulting from stream’s assimilating capacity. The location specific environmental water quality 
and quantity are then reflected by prices for water licences and pollution permits. Where both 
dimensions of a water resource (quantity and quality), have a price the users and polluters face 
the real cost of using the resource and can flexibly adjust quantities consumed or discharged.  
If water is a scarce resource and environmental quality is a constraint, establishing 
quantity and quality markets in parallel could constitute a model that would satisfy the criteria 
for an optimal resource allocation system, i.e. a system that is efficient, perceived by users as 
equitable and one that creates incentives for conservation. Allocation by market instruments 
assumes that there is a limit to water consumption and rights to use the existing supply should be 
reallocated between users in accordance with the marginal value of water in each use. Where 
environmental water quality is a constraint and there is a need to improve environmental water 
quality and reduce pollution from multiple sources, including previously unregulated nonpoint 
sources, pollution markets prove more effective and less costly. A pollution cap represents a 
limit to pollution and calls for a need to reallocate responsibilities in accordance with values and 
costs of pollution to each user.  
Where there is a demand both for high quality water and pollution, markets meet the 
efficiency criteria by allocating both water and pollution to their highest-value uses. Users make 
decisions in response to incentives from changing resource quantity and quality. Incentives 
generated by markets, i.e. market-cleared prices that reflect the value of water and pollution, 
ensure that users take into account the real opportunity costs of water resource uses.  
Markets can create incentives for conservation as environmental water quality improves 
as a result of pollution reduction efforts by all sources. Legitimizing private instream flow rights 
and allowing private sector water users to hold rights to instream flow for improving stream’s 
assimilating capacity might create even stronger incentives for conservation and improve water 
quality further (Andersen and Snyder 1997). A pollution cap represents the limit to pollution and 
consumption as it is derived from the function of current assimilating capacity of a stream (Howe 
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et al. 1986). Where a diversion cap is ineffective in supplying water for instream flow due to 
resistance from consumptive users to give up water, then, considering the interrelatedness of 
quantity and quality, a pollution cap can set a limit to consumption by creating private incentives 
to leave more water instream. Allowing private rights to instream flow might as well improve the 
efficiency of allocation by water markets as environmental values will be included into 
competition for water (Andersen and Snyder 1997). Polluters could offset pollution by acquiring 
private rights to equivalent volume of instream flow necessary to enhance assimilating capacity 
of the stream (Andersen and Snyder 1997). In addition to improving water quality, this practice 
might benefit other instream flow users such as people engaged in fisheries or recreation, by 
maintaining sufficient streamflows, reduced effect from eutrophication and improved aesthetics. 
There are a number of conditions that might trigger institutional change. Since markets 
can only allocate a resource efficiently if it is in short supply, water scarcity and diminishing 
quality are the main conditions for implementing water quantity and quality markets. Another 
condition is the existing or emerging demand for higher-quality water, (for personal 
consumption) and the evident impact on water quality by other users (agricultural). Also, market 
prices for water rights and pollution permits depend on opportunity costs resulting from the use 
of water and/or magnitude of pollution reduction costs. Therefore, heterogeneity of users and 
polluters, i.e. the presence of users with varying technological and economic potential, is another 
condition that triggers the implementation of markets. 
Research shows that water quantity and quality markets administered in parallel, could 
help to improve the efficiency of water use and water quality.  This would work best in a region 
where government regulation fails to reallocate rights and responsibilities related to water use, 
and where traditional water allocation systems create resistance to change in spite of growing 
demands. Regardless of water quality and quantity, change from one administrative system to 
another would likely result in resistance by some users.  To test the likelihood of transitioning 
from a command-and-control-type system to a market-based system that includes quality and 
quantity elements, it is important to select a study area with evidence of increasing demand for 
water and increasing pollution. Additionally it will be important to assess users’ perceptions of 
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both water quality and quantity, satisfaction with the current water administration and the 
acceptance of water markets in general.  
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3 METHODOLOGY  
This section describes the research methods used to assess stakeholders’ perception about 
water resource status in the SSRB and the performance of existing and proposed systems of 
administration to maintain water users’ rights and responsibilities in the region. It includes 
several sections that (1) describe the study area according to key characteristics related to water 
availability and use (2) the survey instrument used to examine stakeholders’ perceptions, and (3) 
survey methodology using the z-scored statistical method (ZEF) and (4) sampling methods.  
3.1 Study area description  
The area selected for this study was within the SSRB (Figure 3.1), a large watershed in 
southern Alberta known for its historical water scarcity, emerging issues with water quality and 
where water was traditionally allocated under the system of prior allocation, recently 
supplemented by market regulation. 
 
Figure 3.1 South Saskatchewan River Basin (adopted from: Alberta Environment 2005) 
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The proposed case study was aimed at examining stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
resource status and the ability of the existing and proposed systems of water administration to 
maintain rights and responsibilities pertaining to the use of water. The obtained results were 
used to assess the acceptability of water quality markets and possible institutional barriers to 
implementation. 
Alberta has only 2.2% of Canada’s renewable freshwater, of which only 10% is available 
in the south where 90% of Alberta’s 3.5 million population resides (Christensensen and Droitsch 
2008, Vander Ploeg 2010). Only 3% of water withdrawn in Alberta comes from groundwater. 
Most of the freshwater supply depends on variable and unpredictable flows in rivers. 
Additionally, the population is expected to increase by 40% in the next 20 years with an 
estimated increase in water consumption of 25% by 2020 (Vander Ploeg 2010). The impact 
from climate change is also likely to decrease water availability by 7-10% by 2020 (Maas and 
Telfer 2007). The SSRB with its three major tributaries – Oldman, Bow and Red Deer rivers – 
constitutes the main source of water supply in Southern Alberta. Almost 60% of all water 
allocations in the province are held within SSRB, and 80% of all water consumption occurs. 
Industrial allocations account for 3% and are held mainly by oil and gas companies in the Red 
Deer sub-basin, where 70% of all industrial allocations in the SSRB are found. The municipal 
sector holds 11% of all allocations, of which 75% are found in the SSRB (Vander Ploeg 2010). 
The South Saskatchewan River alone accounts for 60% of allocations for municipal use. Over 
97% of all provincial agricultural allocations are held within the SSRB. Of this, over 96% of all 
water is used for irrigation, with the remaining 4% used for stock watering.  Although more than 
20,000 licences have been issued since 1894, approximately 75% of the water is tied to fewer 
than 20 of the licences issued to 13 irrigation districts located between Calgary, Lethbridge and 
Medicine Hat (Christensensen and Droitsch, 2008). Furthermore, the agricultural sector is the 
largest water consumer in Alberta and accounts for more than 95% withdrawal and 
consumption. Allocations in the South Saskatchewan River sub-basin are very much dependent 
on water consumption that takes place in the Bow and Oldman rivers (Van Ploeg 2010).  Figure 
3.2 shows sectoral water allocations in the SSRB.  
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Figure 3.2 Sectoral water allocations in the SSRB (adopted from: Alberta Environment 2010) 
Water is administered in Alberta through combination of government regulation of water 
quantity and quality and markets that are used to transfer water licences. In the late 1990s due to 
water shortages the Bow, Oldman and South Saskatchewan rivers were closed to further 
allocations. Following the suspension, the Alberta government authorized allocation by market 
regulation and revised the Alberta Water Act and Alberta Irrigation Act accordingly. Among the 
primary reasons for administering a market system was the need to reallocate water from existing 
uses into emerging uses and to improve the efficiency of water use. Transfers within irrigation 
districts are now regulated by the Irrigation Districts Act (2000), performed in an informal 
manner by mutual agreement without oversight by external authority (Vander Ploeg 2010). The 
Alberta Water Act, S.82 (1999) allows water transfers of all or part of a licenced allocation from 
the existing licencee to new users provided that such a proposed transfer does not result in any 
damage to the rights of other users and aquatic environment. The Alberta government designated 
Alberta Environment to supervise all transactions that involve a transfer of all or part of a licence 
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(Percy and Weber 2010). According to the legislation, the provision and protection of instream 
flow interests has become a responsibility of the provincial government. Under the Alberta 
Water Act, S.81 (1999) Alberta Environment is required to establish water management plans for 
each basin, which would specify appropriate conservation objectives based on estimated minimal 
streamflow requirements. The appropriate conservation objectives, where they are established, 
guide the decisions of a designated authority about water licence allocations and proposed 
transfers.  
Within the study area point source pollution is strictly regulated and, therefore, impact is 
minimal from municipal and industrial sources. However, there is no regulation that would 
effectively control or prevent the pollution from agricultural non-point pollution (Matisz et al. 
2010). Growing cities and resulting urban runoffs represent a challenge for regulators and pose a 
threat to surface water quality (Vander Ploeg 2010). 
Because of these factors, the area is ideal to test perceptions regarding resource status 
(water quality and quantity), perceptions about performance of the current administration and 
likelihood of adopting a new administration, i.e. water quality markets. 
3.2 Survey instrument 
A questionnaire was developed and implemented to assess stakeholders’ perceptions of 
current and a proposed water resource allocation approaches. The instrument was approved by 
the University of Saskatchewan Ethics Review Board.  
The survey consisted of three sections, each addressing the respective research objective: 
1. To evaluate stakeholder perceptions of the current resource status (scarcity/quality)  
2. To evaluate stakeholders’ perceptions of the current resource administration including 
their experience with water markets 
3. To evaluate the willingness to adopt a proposed water quality market mechanism 
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Following the short introduction and description of the research project respondents were 
offered a choice to agree or disagree to participate in the survey (see Appendix A). Those who 
agreed were offered three groups of questions.  
In the first section respondents were requested to share their perceptions about water 
scarcity and quality at their locations. They were also offered the opportunity to indicate the 
extent to which their current and future needs in water were satisfied. The following set of 
questions addressed the possible causes of diminishing water quality and declining water supply. 
Users were requested to indicate the extent to which the pollution sources contributed to the 
pollution of surface water. 
The second group of questions solicited stakeholders’ perceptions of the current water 
administration including their experience with water markets. Under the current administration 
access to water can be secured by purchasing licences in the market. Government no longer 
allocates water but retains control over allocation by supervising transfers, establishing flow 
requirements and regulating water quality. The current administration specifies how rights to use 
water are exercised and the responsibilities for pollution abatement. Questions in section two 
were structured so as to assess the relative importance of such rights and responsibilities to users 
and the performance of the existing system in provision of these services.  
In the third section, upon provision of a brief description of the proposed system, 
respondents were offered a chance to consider the changes that proposed system, i.e. imposition 
of a pollution cap and establishment of tradable discharge permits, would induce on their current 
rights and responsibilities and to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the proposed 
system. 
3.3 Survey methodology 
The assessment of stakeholders’ perception about the adoption of proposed water 
governance systems was performed through an online stakeholders’ survey developed 
specifically to collect and analyze electronic data. The results of the survey were analyzed using 
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z-scoring, a statistical technique performed by ZEF (Z-scored Electronic Feedback) software. Z-
scores are standardized deviations from their means and always have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. The standardized or normalized values provide a way of comparing 
the results without opinion distortion.  The example below shows the typical absolute (a) and 
processed normalized (b) survey results.  
      
Figure 3.3 (a) Absolute results  (b) Normalized results 
Adopted from: http://kysy.oamk.fi/zef/docs/zef-method-en.pdf 
Figure 3.3a and 3.3b show the absolute and normalized results of responses based on two 
criteria: performance on the x-axis and importance on the y-axis.  The absolute results (Figure 
3.3a) reflect the average response scores reported according to responses as marked directly by 
survey respondents on the two-by-two grid. Normalized values (Figure 3.3b) are calculated using 
z-scoring whereby the distribution is centered so that the mean value is zero. Standard deviations 
are shown by shaded areas. 
The strength of this method is reflected in the interpretation of the normalized responses 
by quadrant.  Whereas standard survey methodology asks one question, the grid method provides 
a richer palette of responses and allows relative ranking of results in relation to each other. 
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3.4 Sampling 
The SSRB study area in southern Alberta included four sub-basins – the Bow, Red Deer, 
Oldman and South Saskatchewan rivers. Sampling took place randomly across sub-basins. The 
surveyed population targeted three groups: (1) agricultural, including representatives from 
irrigation districts, (2) municipalities, composed of municipal water/wastewater managers 
(including the four largest cities in the watershed: Calgary, Lethbridge, Red Deer and Medicine 
Hat, and (3) others, which included views of the provincial government, NGOs and 
representatives from the academic community. Municipal and agricultural water users represent 
two large groups of water users that hold the largest number of private water licences and, 
therefore, have greater influence on water use, and as a consequence, on water availability and 
quality. The majority of transactions within water markets occurred between these two groups. 
Similarly, implemented water quality trading took place either between municipal wastewater 
treatment facilities or through a form of offsets acquired by municipal users from reductions by 
non-point agricultural sources. The survey was distributed to senior-level water managers in both 
groups based on the assumption that they would have been knowledgeable about 
water/wastewater treatment costs and costs of improving water use efficiency and/or pollution 
reduction costs by non-point sources.  
The participation of the academic community provided additional background for the 
assessment of stakeholders’ perceptions from a broader economic and legal perspective. Views 
from regulatory authorities helped to understand the position of the government with regard to 
the existing and proposed systems. The purpose of recruiting respondents beyond municipal and 
agricultural sources was to allow for the inclusion of interests by a diversity of water users. It 
was decided not to include the general public because survey questions aimed primarily at 
examining perceptions about private rights and responsibilities and focused on responses by 
private agents to proposed policy changes. Respondents were requested to answer only relevant 
questions.  The last section of the survey included demographic questions, such as age, gender, 
education and income. In this section respondents were also requested to indicate their location 
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in the watershed to facilitate the correlation of responses to potential impacts on water 
availability and quality.  
Survey participants were selected using a public directory listing the contacts of Alberta 
municipal water authorities and irrigation districts. Participants were invited to complete the 
survey and were also asked to recruit interested parties.   
The survey was pretested on 47 individuals involved in researching various water-related 
issues at the University of Saskatchewan. The survey was modified accordingly and the final 
survey instrument was emailed to potential respondents.    
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4 RESULTS  
This chapter presents the survey results beginning with a description of response rates, 
licence holders and trading experience. The next three sections focus on stakeholders’ 
perceptions about resource status and the current and proposed systems of administration. The 
chapter concludes with the results of a hypothetical referendum and demographics. 
4.1 Response rate 
The Internet survey was open for three weeks (from April 7
th
 to April 30
th
, 2013). After 
the initial invitation, two reminders were sent a week apart to increase the response rate. A total 
of 200 invitations were sent to three groups including: 
 Municipal water supply/wastewater – 127 individuals 
 Irrigation districts – 8 individuals 
 Others (academic, regulatory, NGOs) – 65 individuals 
The total number of responses received was 40 giving an overall response rate of 19.1%. 
According to self-identification there were 16 municipal participants, two from irrigation 
districts, and 22 respondents in the “others” category, including academic, regulatory, NGOs and 
First Nations.  
Since the survey sought to assess views on water markets, it was important to ask if 
respondents held licences. Seventeen respondents (50.0%) stated that they did not hold water 
licences. Of those respondents who did, 13 (38.2%) held transferable licences; two (5.9%) had 
licences that were not transferable, and two (5.9%) were not sure if their licences were 
transferable Figure 4.1. In addition, 30 respondents (88.2%) did not have experience 
participating in water trading, whereas only five respondents (14.7%) participated indicating they 
were buyers.  
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Figure 4.1 Respondents with transferable licences 
4.2 Perceptions of the current resource status  
Questions in this section focused on stakeholders’ perceptions about current water 
resource status. This section was divided into questions pertaining to water quantity and water 
quality. Respondents were first requested to indicate their agreement with the statement: “Water 
is becoming more scarce.” More than half of the respondents (n=24; 68.6 %) agreed that water is 
becoming scarcer; whereas eight respondents (22.9%) disagreed and three respondents (8.6%) 
were not sure (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Perceptions about water scarcity 
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In follow-up questions, respondents rated their ability to secure access to water and the 
extent to which water is available to satisfy their needs. Normalized responses are illustrated in 
Figure 4.3 with the standard deviation indicated by the shaded area around each number. The 
question numbers correspond to the numbers in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 Security of access to water 
(1) I have secure access to water (n=25) 
(2) I have sufficient water for my needs (n=23) 
(3) I have the ability to secure water licence (n=23) 
Respondents strongly agreed with their ability to maintain secure access to water (1) and 
that they could satisfy their current needs in water (2). Although it appears that the majority of 
respondents did not agree that they have the ability to secure water licences (3), opinions were 
more varied as indicated by a greater standard deviation. Respondents were also asked to provide 
additional remarks about issues related to water availability and supply of which 15 commented. 
Several respondents pointed out that the watershed had been closed for new allocations, and that 
licences could be secured only through water markets. According to participants’ comments, 
water availability varies by location in the watershed. In general, water was perceived to be 
available for most uses, including municipal, where most municipal licences could satisfy 
potential future growth. Notwithstanding, respondents agreed that water is becoming 
increasingly scarce and that demand is growing steadily. Water quantity was regarded as a big 
concern by an Alberta First Nations person, and not sufficient to satisfy the instream flow needs. 
Finally, one respondent mentioned the importance of private rights to instream flow.  
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A second group of questions focused on surface water quality. The first question 
addressed stakeholders’ perceptions about water quality. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their agreement with a statement that surface water quality is diminishing (Figure 4.4). In total, 
34 people responded and more than half agreed that quality was decreasing (n=20; 58.8%).  Nine 
respondents disagreed (26.5%) and five were not sure (14.7%).  
 
Figure 4.4 Perceptions about water quality 
Participants were also asked to provide their perceptions of pollution sources specified by 
the following statements. The normalized responses are shown in Figure 4.5.  
(1) Municipal water is polluting surface water (n=23) 
(2) Industrial water is polluting surface water (n=23) 
(3) Agricultural runoff is polluting surface water (n=23) 
(4) There is not enough water instream to assimilate waste in surface water (n=23) 
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Figure 4.5 Opinions about pollution sources 
Results suggest that the highest number of respondents strongly agree that agricultural 
runoff is polluting surface water (3). Similarly, there is little variation regarding the response as 
evidenced by the standard deviation. Opinions about other pollution sources varied across 
respondents. However, participants moderately agreed that industrial sources are a source of 
pollution (2), second to agricultural runoff. They generally disagreed that municipal wastewater 
contributes to the pollution of surface water (1). Also, the majority of respondents disagreed that 
pollution was a result of an impaired ability of a stream to assimilate wastes due to the lack of 
water (4).  
Thirteen participants provided comments on water quality in the region. Respondents 
(n=3) commented on issues associated with prevailing pollution by agricultural non-point source 
pollution, which is consistent with the overall perception that agriculture is the main source of 
pollution out of the four presented. Respondents (n=2) pointed out that continuous improvements 
to municipal wastewater treatment facilities are being implemented in order to comply with 
regulations and to keep municipal discharges within established limits. One respondent 
suggested contamination from large cities e.g. Calgary and Lethbridge, was a contributing factor. 
Two participants related the extent of surface water pollution to the flow level, and emphasized 
increased treatment efforts (n=1) by municipal water supply services to meet potable water 
standards when flows are low. 
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4.3 Perceptions about the current water administration 
Respondents were provided with a brief description of the current system of water 
administration (the status quo) and were invited to answer questions about the ability of the 
current system to secure rights and responsibilities related to water access and water use. Two 
questions were asked simultaneously: importance measured on the vertical access and the current 
administration’s ability to provide such rights – measured on the horizontal access.   
The section was composed of 10 statements about the current system. Figure 4.6 
summarizes the normalized results using the z-scoring method with each number on the graph 
corresponding to the numbered statement. 
 
Figure 4.6 Perceptions about current administration 
(1) The ability to satisfy water quantity needs (n=29) 
(2) The ability to provide high water quality (n=28) 
(3) The ability to transfer the licence (n=28) 
(4) The ability to secure/renew the licence even if water is not used (n=28) 
(5) The ability to uphold the position of the licence in a first-in-time-first-in-right system (n=27) 
(6) Enforcement of regulations to maintain water quality (n=27) 
(7) The ability to secure long-term access to water (n=27) 
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(8) The ability to hold municipal polluters responsible for water pollution (n=27) 
(9) The ability to hold agricultural polluters responsible for water pollution (n=27) 
(10) The ability to hold industrial polluters responsible for water pollution (n=27) 
 
As reported in Figure 4.6, answers registering in the upper right quadrant indicate that 
respondents felt that rights and responsibilities were both important and that the current 
administration had the ability to deliver. This included providing water quality (2), holding 
industrial polluters responsible for their share of pollution (10), and the ability to enforce 
relevant regulations on municipal pollution sources (8). The normalized results are also 
consistent with open comments provided by some respondents.  
The upper left quadrant is important in that respondents perceive rights to be important, 
but believe that the current administration has a relatively weaker ability to ensure such rights. 
Three responses were registered including the system’s ability to maintain a secure water supply 
(1), the ability to secure/renew licences for unused water (4), and ensuring long-term access to 
water (7).   
Results registered in the lower quadrants indicate that respondents felt rights were 
relatively less important. In one case, in spite of low importance, respondents believed that the 
current administration has a relatively strong ability to protect the system of seniority “first-in-
time-first-in-right” FITFIR (5) and enforce pollution control regulations (6) where the latter was 
considered to be relatively more important. 
The lower left quadrant indicates both the perceived relative inability to provide rights 
and the relatively low importance to respondents of such rights.  Two issues include enforcing 
pollution control regulations on agricultural non-point sources (9), and licence transferability (3). 
Agricultural pollution control was ranked considerably higher in importance than transferability.  
It is important to reiterate that rankings are relative and that transferability (3) for example was 
not ranked absolutely at zero on both scales. 
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Ten respondents provided comments on the current system of administration. Six 
respondents remarked on pollution control from non-point sources suggesting pollution by point 
sources is strictly regulated (n=3), although one respondent pointed out that the system is 
becoming less efficient due to continuous population growth. Four respondents emphasized low 
effectiveness of the system in administering water licences transfers. According to some (n=3), 
the system is challenged by balancing environmental responsibility and meeting non-
environmental interests in water.  One respondent pointed out that new allocations under the 
current system were not issued in order to save water for future needs and that transfers of 
unused licenced volumes were not permitted and unused water was subject to cancellation.  
4.4 Perceptions about the proposed system of administration 
The proposed scenario suggested that the Government of Alberta would introduce a 
pollution cap as specified in the survey instrument: 
Proposed Water Administration: the Government of Alberta could introduce a 
pollution cap that specifies the maximum amount of pollution allowed into a water 
source. The sum of all permits would account for the total allowable quantity of a 
specified pollutant in a water source (as specified by the “cap”). Those who wish to 
discharge more pollutants (for example those arising from nutrients such as phosphorus 
and nitrogen) would be required to purchase additional permits. 
Where implemented, quality trading markets created incentives for previously 
unregulated pollution sources to reduce pollution. A pollution cap will result in higher 
compliance costs in the short run for some polluters who can be identified. Under the 
proposed system, polluters with high compliance costs lower their costs by purchasing 
permits from sources with lower compliance sources. Thus, the proposed system 
promotes equity in pollution abatement. In general, water quality markets create 
incentives to reduce pollution and improve environmental water QUALITY.  
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Respondents were asked to provide their perceptions of the proposed system’s ability to address 
the same issues using the same scale of ability and importance. Results are compared against the 
results for the current administration as illustrated in Figure 4.7.  The letter “E” represents the 
overall average of all responses in blue for the current water administration and the letter “F” 
represents the overall average of all responses in red for the proposed administration. Black 
arrows are used to illustrate shifts in stakeholders’ perceptions between the current (blue) and 
proposed (red) administrative systems. 
 
Figure 4.7 Perceptions about proposed system of administration 
(1) The ability to satisfy water quantity needs (n=26) 
(2) The ability to provide high water quality (n=26) 
(3) The ability to transfer the licence (n=26) 
(4) The ability to secure/renew the licence even if water is not used (n=26) 
(5) The ability to uphold the position of the licence in a first-in-time-first-in-right system (n=26) 
(6) Enforcement of regulations to maintain water quality (n=26) 
(7) The ability to secure long-term access to water (n=26) 
(8) The ability to hold municipal polluters responsible for water pollution (n=26) 
(9) The ability to hold agricultural polluters responsible for water pollution (n=26) 
(10) The ability to hold industrial polluters responsible for water pollution (n=26) 
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Respondents’ ranking of eight out of ten characteristics shifted upwards on the 
importance axis. Similarly, the ability of the system under the proposed scenario to maintain 
sixty percent of the rights and responsibilities has improved relative to the current system with 
three weaker and one unchanged.  
The importance of renewing licences for unused water (4) has decreased, and the ability 
of the proposed system to maintain a renewal of these licences is still very low but slightly 
improved. Respondents rank higher the importance of satisfying and providing water quantity (1) 
and quality (2). Respondents’ ranking of the system’s ability to maintain water quantity needs is 
still rather low under the proposed system but water quality needs are satisfied but to a lesser 
extent. Importance of ability to secure long-term access to water (7) has increased but the ability 
of the system to maintain the access has diminished further. However, the importance of 
pollution control regulations and the ability to enforce the regulations (6) increased. Respondents 
did not perceive that licence transferability (3) would improve under the proposed system. 
However, the proposed system’s ability to uphold licencee’s positions in a FTFR system (5) 
diminished although the importance of the seniority system increased.  
As expected, the proposed system induced changes in perception regarding pollution 
control enforcement across sources (6). Performance improved with industrial (10) and 
agricultural sources (9), although agricultural pollution still posed a challenge and there was no 
significant difference regarding regulation of pollution from municipal sources (8) between the 
current and proposed systems.    
Seven respondents commented about the proposed system of administration. Three 
respondents pointed out that the proposed system would be unable to deal with water 
availability/supply issues. One respondent mentioned legal constraints that limit flexibility, e.g. 
the possibility to lose water if it is unused.  Four respondents argued that non-point sources 
would still pose a challenge. One respondent questioned the ability of a market instrument to 
deal with water pollution properly and mentioned the efforts of the Alberta government to 
develop programs that have better potential to reduce pollution than do market-based 
instruments.  
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4.5 Voting for the proposal 
Finally, respondents were offered the opportunity to vote for or against the proposed 
system. It was suggested that the proposal would pass if 51% of voters were in favour.  Twenty-
two respondents voted: the results of the hypothetical referendum are shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.8 Results of hypothetical referendum 
While the greater number of respondents (n=9) voted in favour of the proposed 
administration, the proposal did not pass with only 40.9% of the 51% required.  Six respondents 
voted against the proposal (27.3%, n=6); and seven were not sure (31.8%,). Four respondents 
who voted against the system explained their positions:  
(1) The current system is sound. 
(2) Water needs to be monitored at a higher level of authority where that authority takes into 
account all factors in a watershed. 
(3) Too important to be less than 66% 
(4) No referendum could be held unless adequate information is provided.  
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4.6 Demographics 
Only 24 respondents answered the demographic questions.  Half of those respondents 
self-identified as “municipal” (n=12), followed by “other” (41.7%, n=10) and “agricultural – 
irrigation” (8.3%, n=2) (Figure 4.9).  
 
Figure 4.9 Respondents self-identification by user group 
The largest proportion of respondents fell into the age group of 41-60 (59.1%; n=13), 
followed by 26-40 (22.7%; n=5) and 61+ (18.2%; n=4). The majority of respondents were men 
(69.6%; n=16), women accounted for 21.7% (n=5) with two respondents preferring not to reveal 
their gender.   
Regarding education, the majority of respondents completed a Master’s degree (56.5%, 
n=13), followed by a bachelor’s degree and trade school (13%, n=3 in each group), one 
respondent had a PhD (4.3%), and one respondent completed K-12 (4.3%). The remainder 
preferred not to say (8.7%).  
Information about income was provided by 23 respondents, of which six (31.6%) 
preferred not to answer, four respondents (21.1%) fell within the $30,000-59,999 range; one 
respondent (5.3%) fell within the $60,000-79,999 range; four respondents (21.1%) fell within the 
$80,000-99,999 range; and four respondents (21.1%) reported income equal to or above 
$150,000. 
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The majority of respondents self identified as urban (n=14; 63.6%), and eight as rural 
(36.4%) (Figure 4.10).  
 
Figure 4.10 Respondents self-identification by location 
Several respondents indicated the nearest city to them by sub-basin including: 
 Bow river sub-basin: 
o Cochrane (n=1), Calgary (n=4), Okotoks (n=1) 
 Oldman river sub-basin: 
o Lethbridge (n=4), Vauxhall (n=1)   
 Red Deer river sub-basin: 
o Irricana (n=1), Hanna (n=1), Sundre (n=1) 
The sample did not reflect the general population and therefore, results do not reflect general 
perceptions but rather the perceptions of specific groups of water managers.  
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Response rate 
The results obtained from the survey allowed me to examine the perceptions of different 
groups of stakeholders about the potential to implement the proposed conjunctive water 
administration system using markets for pollution. The main group was composed of agricultural 
(irrigation) and municipal users that represent private interests in water. Respondents in the 
“municipal’ group were composed of water managers from 16 municipalities and regional water 
supply services including the City of Calgary and the City of Lethbridge, both of which are 
providing water to a large number of communities in the region. Two out of eight irrigation 
district managers provided responses in the “agricultural” group. The insufficient representation 
from this sector did not allow me to conduct proper statistical analysis and, therefore, research is 
lacking perceptions from this category. Respondents in the “other” category were composed of 
legal academic and government participants and provided insight based on the broader 
perspective of professional knowledge and public and private interests in water. Considering that 
respondents were requested to answer only those questions that were relevant and they were 
comfortable with, the number of responses in each section/question varied. Due to privacy 
settings and lack of self-identification in the “other” group it was impossible to identify and 
analyze responses by NGOs and First Nations. 
5.2 Water resource status 
The literature suggests that the SSRB in Alberta is experiencing pressure with regard to 
resource availability and quality. The majority of respondents agreed that water is becoming 
scarcer (68.6%) and that water quality is an issue of growing concern (58.8%).  
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Figure 5.1 represents the comparison of stakeholders’ views about water quantity and 
quality (nodes denoted by “C” stand for quantity, “D” – for quality) across different response 
groups shown in different colours (blue – others; red – irrigation and municipal and yellow – 
aggregate). Although aggregate results show that respondents are equally concerned about water 
scarcity and quality, respondents in the municipal/ agricultural group (red) demonstrate greater 
concern about resource becoming scarcer than they do with regard to water quality.  
Greater concern about scarcity is understandable, considering that the SSRB region has 
been known for its historical vulnerability to water scarcity. There was more disagreement 
among users with regard to water quality (C) as compared to water quantity (D). Quality has not 
yet been an issue to the extent that precludes users from their designated uses. To date, all 
streams in the basin originate from the Rocky Mountains and, are therefore, relatively pristine as 
quality is not altered by uses in jurisdictions upstream. In fact, there have been fewer boiling 
water advisories in Alberta as compared to other provinces in Canada (Vander Ploeg 2010). 
Respondents in the “other” group reveal greater concerns about water quality than do municipal 
and agricultural users. In fact, although not yet an issue on a basin-wide scale, diminishing 
quality is evident in some areas (Matisz et al. 2010).  
Although respondents do not completely disregard this possibility, there is little 
correlation between diminishing streamflow and deteriorating surface water quality. According 
Figure 5.1 Comparison of perceptions about 
quantity and quality 
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to respondents’ comments, higher pollution concentrations have been observed when flow was 
low. This observation suggests that the relationship between decreasing quality and decreasing 
streamflow might become more evident if annual average flows continue to decline.  
5.3 Current system of water allocation and use 
The results of the survey largely support findings from the literature with regard to the 
current system’s ability to deliver services pertaining to water quantity and quality. However, 
results are somehow contradictory with regard to stakeholders’ perceptions about the extent of 
impacts and the perceived importance of preventing pollution by certain sources. Also, there is 
some mismatch between users’ perceptions and the literature regarding pollution by various 
sources.  
5.3.1 Perceptions about rights pertaining to water quantity 
Secure access to water was found to be relatively important by the majority of 
respondents (see Figure 4.6). Despite their ability to satisfy immediate needs, municipal uses 
have been concerned about secure access to water to meet the needs of rapidly growing cities if 
resource status changes. Similarly, irrigation is a sector known for its dependence on water 
availability and relatively high withdrawal and consumption rates and is, therefore, vulnerable to 
uncertainty of supply (Vander Ploeg 2010). However, access by irrigation users is well secured 
through the position of their licences in the FITFIR system, as licences issued for irrigation 
purposes are mostly senior compared to licences issued for municipal and other uses. Therefore, 
upholding the position in the FITFIR system is important for the irrigation sector but not 
important for the rest of respondents. Participants appeared to agree that the current 
administration system was rather effective in protecting the system of prior allocation. This 
observation is consistent with the conclusions by Percy and Weber (2010), and Matisz et al. 
(2010) that it is unlikely that FITFIR will be abandoned. In southern Alberta, the government 
implemented the market system to allow for reallocation or negotiated compensation while 
leaving prior allocation intact.  
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The perceptions about the respondents’ ability to secure rights in terms of quantity under 
the current system are consistent with respondents’ opinions about water availability and security 
of their access to water (see Figure 4.3). Participants’ current needs are satisfied mostly owing to 
relatively abundant supply and lower withdrawals although the watershed has been closed for 
new allocations, and, therefore, most users are unable to secure more water unless licences are 
purchased through markets. Users’ ratings and comments illustrate the inability of the 
government to supply more water if the watershed reached the allocation limit. Furthermore, 
considering unpredictability and a possible decline of future supply respondents suggest that the 
government will be unable to deliver water in a long run. 
Although respondents appeared to understand the inability of the government to issue 
new licences, they rank relatively low the importance of their ability to transfer licences. A 
possible reason for this might be relatively abundant supply in recent years and, therefore, 
dormant markets that can be active if water is in scarce supply. In fact, some market activity was 
observed only during the prolonged drought in 2001-2002 (Nicol and Klein 2006). Therefore, 
transferability of the licences can only be appreciated by those who faced a risk of running out of 
water or experienced markets as buyers or sellers, i.e. the 14.7% of respondents who participated 
in trading as buyers. The insufficient number of respondents from all sub-basins could have 
distorted the results with regard to importance of transferability. For instance, according to 
Bjornlund et al. (2007) who performed a survey examining stakeholders’ willingness to accept 
market-based instruments revealed that support for such in the SSRB varied across sub-basins 
and a higher level of support was found in watersheds with the most reliable and predictable 
supply. Intensive government regulation and limited transferability might be another potential 
barrier precluding users from exploring markets. Extensive government oversight is required for 
all transfers that imply moving water outside irrigation districts, e.g. into municipal uses with 
higher efficiency yields considering significant differences between the marginal value of water 
in urban and irrigation uses (Nicol and Klein 2006, Bjornlund  et al. 2007. Several respondents 
mentioned the importance of transfers for satisfying future growth. However, respondents’ 
ranking of the system’s ability to encourage and facilitate transfers has been very low. According 
to users’ comments, in order to function properly the process of water transfers should be 
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streamlined and users should be given the opportunity to sell saved water.     
Given that respondents (n=27) emphasized the importance of renewing licences even for 
unused water under the current administration, such an issue could be a serious impediment to 
the adoption of markets.  In southern Alberta users face higher risk of losing a part of the unused 
water in the course of trading as a result of a 10% holdback imposed on transfers via markets 
(Percy and Weber 2010). According to Percy and Weber (2010) the possibility to lose water 
through the 10% conservation holdback might prevent senior rights holders from transferring 
water on a temporary basis in particular, if they know that at the end of the contract period their 
licence will be reduced by 10%.  
In addition to impeding markets, a risk to lose water might discourage conservation. 
Some of the users’ comments suggest that closing watersheds and allowing trading had positive 
implications and motivated users to engage in conservation activities and increase water 
productivity by consumptive uses. Irrigation districts and municipalities initiated large-scale 
infrastructure upgrades, investments in water-efficient equipment, and introduced policies 
encouraging water-saving behaviours (AECOM 2009, Vander Ploeg 2010).  
5.3.2 Perceptions about rights pertaining to water quality 
Results about the ability of the system to maintain acceptable water quality are consistent 
with conclusions made in the first section that relatively good water quality is a result of both 
quality and quantity of the supply and compliance by point source polluters. The performance of 
the current pollution control system was found to be asymmetrical with regard to identifying and 
controlling pollution by various sources. Respondents revealed that they perceived agriculture to 
be a source of pollution in the SSRB, as well as the industrial sector (see Figure 4.5). In southern 
Alberta, the dominance of the agricultural industry, i.e. density of livestock production and 
extensive irrigation, indicates the potential for agricultural non-point source pollution as being 
recognized as a leading source of diminishing surface water quality (Matisz et al. 2010). In fact, 
concentrations of nutrients, bacteria and other pollutants are higher near the areas of intensive 
agricultural development. It is not surprising that respondents indicated the inability of the 
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system to regulate pollution from non-point agricultural sources.  
The existence of significant non-point source pollution in the region has been well 
documented in the literature and acknowledged by some respondents. However, the overall 
ranking was rather low with regard to the importance of preventing pollution by agricultural 
sources, likely it is difficult to identify, attribute and control due to its non-point source origins.  
Furthermore, matching pollutants to sources might be challenging at locations where both 
agricultural and urban pollution takes place. Whereas some pollutants, e.g. Protozoan parasites, 
E.coli and some of the livestock wastes can be identified as dominant forms of agricultural 
pollution, whereas other pollutants, i.e. nutrients, pesticides and endocrine-disrupting substances, 
can be a result of both agricultural and urban runoff (Matisz et al. 2010, Alberta Environment 
2005).  
Finally, the majority of respondents agreed that industrial sources were less significant 
than agricultural but more significant than municipal. Industrial use constitutes a very small 
portion of total allocations in the SSRB. The potential impact from industrial sources can be 
more significant in the Red Deer River sub-basin where all allocations for the petroleum industry 
take place. Industrial sources of pollution are point sources and are therefore, subjected to strict 
regulations.  
The enforcement of pollution control regulations was found to be relatively less 
important than other rights/responsibilities of the current water administrative system. In general 
results illustrated the ability of the current system to capture point source pollution only. The 
literature reveals that effectiveness of existing pollution control regulations diminishes as point 
sources approach the efficiency limits in their pollution reduction efforts but environmental 
water quality continues to deteriorate (Woodward and Keiser 2002, Fassbender 1994, Tietenberg 
1990). It could be that the pollution enforcement system was not perceived as important as other 
factors because point sources currently comply with existing regulations.  
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5.4 Proposed system of water allocation and use  
Perceptions about users’ rights and responsibilities were different under the proposed 
system both with regard to water quantity and quality. Perceptions about the proposed system 
revealed relatively higher importance of all rights and responsibilities except the ability to 
secure/renew the licence even if water is not used, which decreased in importance. The ability to 
transfer a licence remained the same. Ranking the new system in terms of its ability to deliver 
rights and responsibilities has not changed significantly but was highest for the ability to hold 
industrial polluters responsible for water pollution followed by the ability to provide high water 
quality, enforce regulations to maintain water quality and to hold municipal polluters responsible 
for water pollution. The proposed system was still perceived weak in its ability to hold 
agricultural polluters responsible for water pollution, although ability slightly improved when 
compared to the existing system. Although respondents ranked rather high the importance of 
securing long-term access to water and satisfy quantity needs, the proposed system was 
perceived as weak in delivering these rights. The system was perceived as able to maintain users’ 
ability to uphold the position of the licence in a FITFIR system and the importance of this right 
has increased considerably.  
5.4.1 Perceptions about rights pertaining to water quantity   
Respondents were not provided with extensive details about the proposed system and its 
possible implications with regard to water quantity. Therefore, results did not show any 
significance changes with regard to the new system’s ability to provide rights and responsibilities 
pertaining to water quantity. However, water availability is important for planning and 
maintaining growth and steady growth across sectors is expected in the region (Vander Ploeg 
2010). Considering future population growth in the region, the high ranking by respondents is 
not surprising in conveying the importance of satisfying water quantity needs and to secure long-
term access to water. However, the system was perceived as low in its ability to provide both 
secure access and water quantity to satisfy current needs. Unless access to water is provided by 
construction of new waterworks, securing long-term access to water will be challenging under 
any system of allocation. According to Vander Ploeg (2010) most water management 
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opportunities have been explored in Southern Alberta. Factoring into respondents’ relatively low 
ranking might be awareness about the possible decline and unpredictability of future water 
supplies (Schindler and Donahue 2006). Whereas immediate short-term needs can be partially 
met through transfers (Horbulyk and Lo 1998), ranking low the ability to transfer licences 
indicates a presence of impediments in transferring water quantity licences. Limited 
transferability can also explain low ability to satisfy water quantity needs under the proposed 
system.  
The low ability to transfer licences can be partially explained by a relatively high risk of 
losing water that is not used. The ability to hold licences even if a portion of a water allocation is 
not used motivates conservation and can encourage users to transfer licences (Harris Consulting 
2003, Percy and Weber 2010).  According to the results, respondents ranked low their ability to 
renew licences even if water in not used, and its importance. At the same time, results 
demonstrated a significant increase in the importance of upholding water users’ positions in the 
system of prior allocation. Upholding the position in FTFR system becomes critical when 
resources are scarce and users’ rights to use water are protected depending on the position of 
their licences in this system (Howe 1998). In the absence of the responses from irrigation 
districts, the largest water users holding the majority of senior licences, it is difficult to determine 
with certainty the reasons for slightly declined ability of the system to uphold positions of the 
licences in the FITFIR system.  
5.4.2 Perceptions about rights pertaining to water quality 
Water quality trading programs can take different forms depending on jurisdictions 
where they are being implemented (Selman et al. 2009). Respondents were not provided with a 
detailed design of the proposed system but the system has several characteristics that are 
common and well known. For instance, concerns about quality are considered drivers for 
establishing a pollution cap and pollution trading and, where established, trading has resulted in 
improved water quality (Selman et al. 2009, Woodward and Keiser 2002). Respondents 
perceived as high the importance and ability of the proposed system to provide high quality 
water and to enforce such a system. Establishment of pollution markets offer greater flexibility 
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in achieving quality objectives but pollution control enforcement systems are supposed to play 
an important role in securing compliance (Eheart and Ng 2004). The role of traditional 
command-and-control measures extends to the establishment of a pollution cap, distribution of 
responsibilities among polluters, assurance of overall compliance through surface water quality 
monitoring and adjustment of the pollution cap as water quality improves (Selman et al. 2009). 
In general, the proposed system was perceived as an improvement in ability to hold all 
listed polluters responsible for their share of pollution (See Figure 4.7) Benefits from trading 
between municipal point-source polluters and agricultural non-point source polluters are well 
documented and trading helped to improve water quality in a cost-effective way where a 
significant impact from agricultural sources had been established (O’Grady et al. 2008, 
Tietenberg 1990). However, despite increased performance the importance of pollution 
prevention from agricultural sources is still relatively low, and prevention of industrial pollution 
is still perceived as important by stakeholders.  
5.5 Conclusions and future research recommendations 
This thesis seeks to explore potentials for improving water resource management system 
by examining the performance of two distinct systems of administration – government 
regulation of water quantity and quality and incentive- or market-based instruments – where the 
water resource is scarce and quality is diminishing. The SSRB in southern Alberta is known for 
its water scarcity and emerging issues with water quality, and therefore, represents a unique 
geographic area where conditions for implementing both water quantity and quality markets 
exist. This research represented the opportunity to examine stakeholders’ perceptions about their 
rights and responsibilities under the current system of allocation with stronger government 
oversight over quantity and quality and under a new system where users are given more 
flexibility in managing their resource.  
The objectives were to (1) identify stakeholders’ perceptions of the current resource 
status (scarcity/quality), (2) evaluate stakeholders’ perceptions of the current water 
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administration including their experience with water markets, and (3) evaluate the willingness to 
adopt a proposed water quality market mechanism using an online survey instrument.  
The results from the survey showed that although current resource status allows secure 
access to water of desirable quality in the short run, the situation is likely to change resulting in 
increasing water scarcity and diminishing water quality. The ability of the existing system to 
satisfy current needs is associated with current resource status and relatively low withdrawals by 
consumptive users. Therefore, satisfying water quantity needs, including environmental, under 
the current system might be challenging in the face of growing demand. Although water quality 
does not pose a problem in the short run and control over point source pollution is relatively 
strong, respondents highlighted the need to find a viable solution to improve identification and 
control by non-point sources.  
Perceptions about the current system’s ability to deliver and the importance of a suite of 
rights and responsibilities revealed that the six most important characteristics were the ability to 
hold industrial polluters accountable, to provide high water quality, to secure/renew licences 
even when not used, to satisfy water quantity needs, to secure long-term access to water and to 
hold municipal polluters responsible. While these aspects of the system were judged to be 
relatively important, the current system’s ability to accomplish such was rated relatively weak 
for licence security and satisfaction of water quantity needs.  Relatively less important was the 
ability to hold agricultural polluters responsible for water pollution, enforcement of regulations 
to maintain water quality, the ability to uphold the position of a licence, and the ability to 
transfer a licence.  
Perceptions about the proposed system revealed relatively higher importance of all rights 
and responsibilities except the ability to secure/renew the licence even if water is not used which 
decreased in importance.  The ability to transfer a licence remained the same.  Furthermore, it is 
important to assess the new system in terms of its ability to deliver rights and responsibilities.  
Ranking highest was the ability to hold industrial polluters responsible for water pollution 
followed by the ability to provide high water quality, enforce regulations to maintain water 
quality, to hold municipal polluters responsible for water pollution and to uphold the position of 
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the licence in FITFIR system.  Where the new system was perceived as weak was the ability to 
satisfy water quantity needs and secure long-term access to water, to hold agricultural polluters 
responsible for water pollution, and the ability to transfer a licence, the latter of which is 
surprising given that markets are authorized and demand is increasing.    
Finally, survey results revealed that the majority of respondents voted in favour of 
adopting the proposed system, although the referendum failed to reach the specified minimum 
of 51%.  According to Howe et al. (1986) an optimal system of resource allocation would be 
one perceived by users as efficient, equitable and one that creates incentives for conservation. 
Although some findings were indicative of increased efficiency, e.g. improved performance in 
holding some polluters responsible, other findings indicated less efficiency, e.g. limited rights 
transferability. Equity is implied when transfers are voluntary (Howe et al. 1986) and costs of 
compliance with an established pollution cap are equalized among sources (Tietenberg 1990, 
Eheart and Ng 2004). Transferability is an important condition for efficiency as water is 
securely held by the same users unless it can freely move among users with different marginal 
values. Considering increasing scarcity and the inability to secure new licences, the relative low 
ranking of transferability on the importance axis is surprising, unless it indicates the presence of 
significant institutional constraints that influence stakeholders’ attitudes towards markets in 
general. Therefore, limited transferability of water licences along with the possibility to lose 
water constitutes barriers to efficiency and equity, and adoption of the proposed system by 
greater than 51% of respondents. Also, insufficient participation from irrigation districts and the 
lack of respondents from the southern sub-basins have possibly distorted the results with regard 
to examining users’ perceptions about transferability, and the extent of pollution impacts by 
various sources.  
Recognition of benefits and lack of essential information have factored into the result of 
the hypothetical referendum: the proposed system did not pass although the greater number 
(40.9%) voted in favour of the system. The ultimate decision on adoption of the proposed 
system would be subject to a greater certainty of outcomes in view of resource status, future 
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regulations of water quantity and a clear understanding of origin and impact by pollution 
sources.  
5.5.1 Future research recommendations 
Possible areas for future research extending from the findings of this thesis would be, 
first of all, modifying the survey to address in more detail the interrelatedness between water 
quantity and quality in the context of the SSRB in Alberta. For instance, users’ willingness to 
leave water instream for compensation or to pay for improving the assimilating capacity of the 
stream were not measured but would be important determinants in accepting a new 
administrative system. Although the proposed system does not directly address water quantity 
issues, considering the interrelatedness of water quantity and quality and how it could influence 
water-use decisions, it would be important to determine the extent to which this interrelatedness 
is captured by regulations. For instance, if private licences to instream flow are authorized, then 
users could purchase or leave water instream to improve a stream’s assimilating capacity and 
offset pollution (Andersen and Snyder 1997). In contrast, if there is a risk of losing unused water, 
users’ decisions will be guided by a need to use water rather than leaving it instream or transfer 
to other uses (Bjornlund 2010, Kwasniak 2006). Responses revealed the importance of the ability 
to secure/renew a licence even if water is not used, a right that if not provided could diminish 
security of tenure and prove inimical to conservation. Considering that existing legislation does 
not specifically authorize private licence holders to establish the ownership to instream flow, any 
water left or transferred instream might be regarded as unused and lost (Kwasniak 2006). 
Therefore, the proposed system will lack incentives to leave water instream as this water will be 
regarded by regulators as unused and might be reallocated into other users. Asking respondents, 
senior licence holders in particular, about perceived changes in their rights if private licences to 
instream flow were legitimized would help to assess private incentives to enhance instream flow 
and inform future policy directions.  
Willingness of private users to transfer water instream for improving the assimilative 
capacity of the stream will also depend on future resource status and availability of higher 
demand for better water quality. When rights are privately held and transferable, users have 
62 
 
incentives to move resources into higher value uses (Stroup and Baden 1979). For example, if 
demand for better water quality is high, then users will have incentives to leave more water 
instream whenever needed to improve water quality. While the results showed the importance of 
water quality, there was no measure of such quality. It would be important to further investigate 
users’ preferences with regard to water quantity and quality in view of current and future 
resource status to determine users’ willingness to pay for better water quality in terms of specific 
measures, or accept compensation for leaving water instream. If demand for better water quality 
exists and the perceived strength of users’ rights improve, stakeholders might be more willing to 
accept the proposed system. 
It would be also useful to examine whether a reduced risk of losing the unused water and 
the ability to hold private licences to instream flow would improve the perceptions of licence 
transferability and, as a result, users’ perceptions about markets in general. The obtained results 
could be used for comparing users’ perceptions about their rights under the current system, when 
the possibility to lose unused water is high. It will be also useful to further observe changes in 
users’ perceptions about the performance of a system to uphold the position of their licences in 
the FITFIR system if saved water could be sold and the risk of losing water were reduced. 
In order to assess the likelihood of adopting a proposed market system it will be 
necessary to develop better insight about the origin and impact of pollution by various sources. 
Prior to establishment of point to non-point source trading programs it would be important to 
ensure that credits generated by nonpoint sources would contribute to overall pollution reduction 
that would not occur otherwise (Selman et al. 2009). It is particularly important in the SSRB 
where according to respondents’ opinions agricultural sources are recognized as contributors to 
pollution but holding agricultural polluters responsible is perceived as not important and the 
ability of both systems weak.  
Finally, in order to assess the acceptability of a proposed system it will be important to 
further examine perceptions from the irrigation sector, which were underrepresented in this 
survey. According to Bjornlund et al. (2007) and Bjornlund (2010) there is little support for 
market-based instruments by irrigation districts primarily due to lengthy process of approval.  
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Considering that the irrigation sector is the largest user of water in the SSRB, and holds the 
majority of senior licences, perceptions by this sector about incentives created by the proposed 
system might inform future policy with regard to water use and pollution regulations. 
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Appendix A - Survey questions 
Invitation  
This survey is being conducted as part of my research to complete a Master degree at the 
School of Environment and Sustainability, University of Saskatchewan. I am examining 
stakeholder perceptions of alternative approaches to managing water quantity and water quality.  
 
Considering a steady trend in urban growth and intensive economic development, water users 
will have to find optimal solutions to improve water management and pursue approaches that 
would address the issues of quantity and quality conjunctively. However, before examining 
suitable policies it is important to consider stakeholders values and perceptions, and advantages 
and disadvantages of administrative changes. 
 
The purpose of my survey is to: 
(i)     Determine your perceptions of current water resource conditions in your area, 
(ii)    Understand your perceptions of the current water administration, including your 
experience with water markets in your area; and 
(iii)   Garner your opinion on adopting water quality markets (e.g. nutrient trading). 
 
This survey will take approximately 10-15 minutes.  Introduction 
Please note: your participation is voluntary and you may quit the survey at any time. All 
data are confidential and your participation is anonymous. This survey has been approved by the 
University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board.  
 
Please consider two scenarios: the status quo as the current water administration, and a proposed 
change to the water administration. 
 
Status Quo/Current Administration: In the southern part of Alberta users who require more water 
may purchase water on the market. Instream flow needs are specified and maintained by 
government regulation establishing minimum flow requirements for each sub-basin. 
 
The government also regulates water quality and is responsible for issuing discharge permits to 
municipal and industrial sources and monitoring compliance and environmental water quality.  
 
Proposed Water Administration: the Government of Alberta could introduce a pollution cap that 
specifies the maximum amount of pollution allowed into a water source.  
 
The sum of all permits would account for the total allowable quantity of a specified pollutant in a 
water source (as specified by the “cap”). 
 
Those who wish to discharge more pollutants (for example those arising from nutrients such as 
phosphorus and nitrogen) would be required to purchase additional permits. 
 
Where implemented, quality trading markets created incentives for previously unregulated 
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pollution sources to reduce pollution. A pollution cap will result in higher compliance costs in 
the short run for some polluters who can be identified. Under the proposed system, polluters with 
high compliance costs lower their costs by purchasing permits from sources with lower 
compliance sources. Thus, the proposed system promotes equity in pollution abatement. In 
general, water quality markets create incentives to reduce pollution and improve environmental 
water QUALITY. 
 
Questions  
(Multi choice) 
Are you willing to participate in survey? (Yes/no) 
 
Resource status 
Identify whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Water is becoming more scarce (Multi Choice Question)  
Agree 
Disagree 
Not sure 
 
Water quality has decreased  (Multi Choice Question) 
Agree 
Disagree 
Not sure 
 
Water licences 
Do you have a right to transfer your licence? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
I don’t have a licence 
 
I have participated in a water transfer as 
A buyer 
A seller 
A regulator 
None of the above 
 
Water characteristics – scarcity 
We would like your opinions on water SCARCITY in your area.  Please consider the 
following statements and indicate your agreement (scale) 
(1) I have secure access to water 
(2) I have sufficient water for my needs 
(3) I have ability to secure a water licence 
(4) Please provide free comments on water scarcity in your area 
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Water characteristics – quality 
We would like your thoughts on water QUALITY in your area. Please consider the 
following statements and indicate your agreement (scale) 
(1) Municipal wastewater is polluting surface water 
(2) Industrial wastewater is polluting surface water 
(3) Agricultural wastewater is polluting surface water 
(4) There is not enough water instream to assimilate waste in surface water 
(5) Please provide free comments on water quality in your area 
 
Current water administration 
 
We would like your thoughts on your current water administration to assess the types of rights 
and responsibilities you think are IMPORTANT to water management, and the ABILITY of the 
current administration to provide such rights and responsibilities.  
 
Note: we are asking two questions simultaneously.  Importance is measured on the vertical 
access and the ability to provide rights is measured on the horizontal access.  If you find a type of 
right/responsibility important, but that the current administration does not have the ability to 
provide the right/responsibility, you would mark your answer in the upper left quadrant for 
example. 
(1) The ability to satisfy water quantity needs 
(2) The ability to provide high water quality 
(3) The ability to transfer licences 
(4) The ability to secure/renew licences even if water is not used 
(5) The ability to uphold the position in FTFR system 
(6) Enforcement of regulations to maintain water quality 
(7) The ability to secure long-term access to water 
(8) The ability to hold municipal polluters responsible for water pollution 
(9) The ability to hold agricultural polluters responsible for water pollution 
(10) The ability to hold industrial polluters responsible for water pollution 
(11) Please provide any comments you wish to make regarding the current water 
administration 
 
Proposed water administration 
We would like your thoughts on the PROPOSED water administration to assess the types 
of rights/responsibilities you think are IMPORTANT to water management, and the ABILITY of 
the proposed administration to provide such rights/responsibilities: 
(1) The ability to satisfy water quantity needs 
(2) The ability to provide high water quality 
(3) The ability to transfer licences 
(4) The ability to secure/renew licences even if water is not used 
(5) The ability to uphold the position in FTFR system 
(6) Enforcement of regulations to maintain water quality 
(7) The ability to secure long-term access to water 
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(8) The ability to hold municipal polluters responsible for water pollution 
(9) The ability to hold agricultural polluters responsible for water pollution 
(10) The ability to hold industrial polluters responsible for water pollution 
(11) Please provide any comments you wish to make regarding the current water 
administration 
 
Voting for the proposal 
Imagine that the PROPOSAL described above will be put to a referendum where if 51% 
of voters are in favour, it will pass: 
Would you vote in favour of accepting the system proposed? 
Yes 
No (why not?) 
Don’t know 
 
Demographics 
Select the category that best describes you; 
Agricultural (please, specify) 
Municipal 
Other (please, specify) 
Nearest town/city 
Age 
18-25 
26-40 
41-60 
61+ 
Prefer not to say 
Location 
Rural  
Urban 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Prefer not to answer 
Education 
K-12 
Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
PhD 
Trade school 
Prefer not to say 
Income 
Below $29,000 
$30,000 – $59,999 
$60,000 - $79,999 
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$80,000 - $99,999 
$100,000 - $149,999 
Above $150,000 
Prefer not to say 
  
77 
 
Appendix B – Anonymous comments  
Water scarcity and quality 
Scarcity 
Municipalities 
 No surface water; 
 Arid community; 
 Water conservation measure in place (water by-law, low flush toilets, etc.); 
 Community has a sound understanding of water conservation, but is growing; 
 Community must live within carrying capacity of local watershed - must find potential 
water license transfers for short and long term; 
 New developments on outskirts of community will increase local water demands; thus 
providing even less water per day, per capita; 
 We have plenty of room in our current license for any growth we may have.  I feel in 
Alberta as a whole, water is becoming scarce, but we are ok; 
 River basin is over allocated, no new licenses are being issued. 
 We access water through a regional water line. Although the supply to us is secure, we 
don't know about where the supply originates; 
 Semi-arid area, although the last 4 years we have had more than average rainfall. During 
2000 - 2002 the area experienced drought conditions which seen potable water usage at 
all time highs although we were able to supply and stay within our annual diversion 
amounts from the Red Deer River; 
 We have a licensed water withdraw volume that well exceeds the present requirements of 
the Town. 
Irrigation 
 No 
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Others 
 Concerned about future water needs and with more urbanization, there is adequate water 
for citizens, and affordable; 
 Water scarcity is less a concern than water quality; 
 Closed basin for surface water allocations.  Instream flow needs are not even close to 
being met in many areas of the SSRB.  Water conservation objectives are considerably 
below IFNs in some areas. Government should entertain and issue as appropriate private 
instream flow licences, as these are permitted by the legislation; 
 The South Saskatchewan River Basin, the source of our supply is closed to new water 
licences.  We can only grow by becoming more efficient in the short term; 
 I am in central Alberta so the conditions on water quantity differ. I don't not have a 
commercial interest in water, I care primarily for the health of aquatic ecosystems; 
 I do not have a water licence, nor do I need one. In Edmonton our water for home use 
comes from the North Saskatchewan, however quality and quantity is in decline. Water 
quality and quantity is a big concern with Alberta First Nations - they often do not have 
the ability or leverage to purchase a water licence; 
 There is no shortage in my area generally, with the exception of the specific industrial 
area known as the, Edmonton Heartland; 
 Sufficient water is generally available to all existing water users.  New water users in the 
Bow and Oldman Basins need to secure a water license from an existing license holder, 
since these basins are closed to new license allocations; 
 During drought years water can be scarce, particularly for high water users such as 
irrigation and golf courses.  Some rationing is also required in some towns; 
 There is sufficient water in this area to meet all needs.  Water may need to be transferred 
from other license holders for new water users. 
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Quality 
Municipalities 
 Small community, limited water pollution from industry. Agricultural un-off from 
surrounding farmers into watershed or rivers may be troublesome if proper riparian zones 
are not established; 
 Experiencing this now with excess nutrients entering reservoir due to outdated farming 
practices; 
 We discharge from our lagoon once a year in the fall... the creek we discharge into is low 
at that time. The water that is discharged is fairly clean, well within "limits" set by 
Environment; 
 For profits (industrial) need to save as much money as possible to increase profits for 
shareholders. Unless they are monitored much closer there is the possibility of polluting 
the ground water. Likewise for agricultural runoff; 
 The quality of potable water in my area is affected by both natural and manmade 
activities.  Spring runoff / snow melt result in very high sediment values.  Low flow rates 
results in microbial growth.  Human activities add undesirable elements.  These and other 
factors result in stringent processing efforts to meet potable water standards. 
Irrigation 
 Nutrient levels are higher than ideal, but probably better than they were prior to 
municipal WWTP upgrades. Very little non-point source  pollution except during runoff 
following heavy precipitation, which is not common most years. Other pollutants do not 
appear to be a concern at this time. 
Others 
 Concerned about oil industry pipeline breaks near waters, e.g. rivers, streams. 
 Water quality varies depending on seasonal flows; 
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 By "my area" I include the SSRB; 
 I am more concerned about endocrine disrupter in water than nutrients or turbidity or 
heavy metals or salts.  Our heavy metal loads are mostly natural, and N and P not 
horribly high, but we don't know impact of people drinking water with hormones etc 
from municipal discharge.  The levels of pathogens are not well known, though the level 
of fecal indicators is.  River flows are high enough to make it difficult to measure small 
amount of contaminants in runoff, but cumulatively these are probably high.  City of 
Calgary and City of Lethbridge are significant sources on pollutants -- perhaps more than 
all others combined; 
 We are continually improving our infrastructure to reduce our impact from both point and 
non point source discharges; 
 I am concerned with lakes, not rivers; 
 It is not (only) water in stream that is necessary to assimilate waste water but the riparian 
areas, wetlands, and aquatic vegetation that is crucial to fill this role. These have been 
compromised in many areas; 
 The water quality is reasonable. It declines downstream of Edmonton, but is sufficiently 
good as not preclude other uses. 
Current system 
Municipal 
 Very time consuming. 
 Difficult to get new water license, or water license transfers. Must think of alternatives 
for water supply and management with a growing urban population and limited water 
resources; 
 In Alberta, municipalities do not have authority / jurisdiction over water.  Alberta 
Environment is the agency with such authority. 
Irrigation 
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 It is a good system. There should be some streamlining of the licence transfer process. 
Point source pollution is dealt with quite well, and under any system non-point source are 
hard to handle. 
Others 
 Don't license all the water away; save licensing for future needs; 
 Do not allow for selling licensed water and allocations not used could be returned to the 
overall needs; 
 Ensure adequate water for urbanization as more people will move to cities; 
 For municipalities and other point sources, water administration has tools for 
management; for non-point source s, no tools for management and enforcement. Water 
quantity tools strong if not used frequently except for environmental needs; 
 Should better regulate non-point source including agricultural sources; 
 Are you talking the current government and its policies and legislation? It was hard to 
answer previous questions not know your definition of water administration; 
 The current GoA Administration has a major role as per Water for Life goals. We need 
safe, secure drinking water, water for healthy ecology and sustainable economy.  Since 
water supplies are indeterminate, the administrator has to manage those supplies within 
the restrictions of supply and ecological needs -- i.e., some of the water is available for 
industry, agriculture, and municipalities.  It is everyone's responsibility to protect the 
quality of the water within economic reason and make the best use of water diverted from 
natural systems, and find better ways of managing use.  Transfers are a method to move 
water volumes to users who need them, and this process is in its infancy and needs time 
to see how well it works.  Non-point source  pollution is challenging to control, but steps 
are being taken to do that.  Point source pollution is better managed, but people have to 
live somewhere and so cities wind up being major pollution sources; 
 In my opinion, the water administration is quite competent. Like every other water 
regulator, it is difficult to deal with non-point source  pollution, especially in agricultural 
run-off; 
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 Current water administration works quite well.  However, the system can seem 
bureaucratic, and slow because of requirements to ensure that any water transfer will not 
harm existing water users.  This requires a great deal of analysis and computer modeling; 
 Considerable research is being carried out in Alberta to assess future water supply and 
needs within changing climate scenarios. 
Proposed system 
Municipalities 
 Water quality is not so much an issue. Water license transfers are needed for short and 
long term water supply; especially with a growing population and encroachment on local 
watershed from new developments; 
 In Alberta, municipalities do not have jurisdiction or authority over water. 
Irrigation:  
 It does not address quantity, so I hit "no answer" on all quantity questions. I did the same 
for quality because the importance of quality issues is identical, no matter which system 
is used, and I did not want my ranking of importance to differ from my ranking under the 
status quo. One problem that I see with the proposed system is the difficulty in addressing 
non-point source s, and the possibility of point source polluters having to indirectly allow 
for highly variable non-point source pollution within their limits. 
Others: 
 Should be reviewed every three years and an active file as our province grows and 
changes; 
 FYI  this survey wasn't user friendly with the quadrant questions; 
 What is proposed water administration?  This is not defined so I cannot answer your 
questions; 
 The questions are a little difficult. Administration alone cannot make more water 
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available in those regions where the law says that no new licences can be issued. 
Similarly, administration cannot allow licences to be transferred in those regions the 
province where transfers are not permitted by law. Administration cannot safeguard 
rights which are not used under license, as the law says the license expires if there is no 
use over a period of three years. Some respondents may be critical of administration in 
these areas, but it's really a question of the present state of the law 
 The Cumulative Effects Management System (CEMS) being proposed by Alberta 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development is designed to target polluters more 
effectively, through monitoring, analysis and active participation with stakeholders.  
However, I'm not aware that serious discussion has yet taken place about purchasing 
additional "pollution" credits, or "trading" pollution credits.  I do not agree with these 
concepts.  In my mind, CEMS is about isolating and mitigating a problem, not collecting 
money to allow a problem to continue. 
 
 
 
